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Cranes, both mobile and static, are mechanical devices that rely on leverage and 
balance between the loads and the counterweight to lift, move, and place those loads. 
Cranes are used in virtually every industry, around the world, and are critical and 
indispensable tools for the dynamic and continually changing nature of construction. 
Despite the utilization of cranes, in almost all industries, humans operate those cranes, 
meaning that human intervention is necessary to rig loads, signal crane maneuvers, operate 
the crane itself, and carry out safety measures that ensure tasks are properly completed. 
Proper lift planning requires the person directing the operation understand lift risks, know 
how to address potential hazards, and communicate that knowledge regarding risks, 
hazards, and safety requirements to members of the lift crew. Interactions among personnel 
who are involved in lifts requires planning, training, and collaboration. Each person must 
correctly perform his or her duties and execute assigned responsibilities as deemed 
necessary. 
Over a period of 30 years, the researcher has analyzed more than 1000 crane 
accidents and accumulated specific data compiled from 701 of those accidents to analyze 
vii 
 
accident details and develop evaluations of factors contributing to accidents. This study’s 
researcher has utilized forensic accident analysis methods to assist in the development of 
crane related protocol suggestions, which, if implemented in the field, should decrease the 
likelihood of accident and consequent injuries, deaths, and property damages. Of the 701 
accidents examined in this study, human interventions caused 651 (92.9%) of the incidents. 
Only 50 (7.1%) of the accidents were caused by machine or mechanical issues. These 
findings conclusively demonstrate the importance of determining why these accidents have 
occurred. 
Based upon the research findings, the researcher has highlighted safety strategies 
that may be utilized to develop crane lift planning practices, which use hazard 
identifications and responsibility assignments in accordance with ASME B30.5-2007. The 
statistical findings indicate that the crane lift processes and resulting accidents are heavily 
influenced by human error and inadequate communication methods among members of the 
lifting crew. Communication was cited by CII as the greatest enabler, including feedback 
from workers that was found to enhance safety. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Cranes 
Cranes are indispensable tools used in construction and other industries which lift loads of 
varying weights, distances, heights, and environments. Changes of working variables (i.e., 
building size, height, weather conditions, job size load often result in accidents which damage 
buildings and cause injuries and fatalities to workers, other field personnel, and even innocent 
bystanders (Häkkinen 1993). Past studies (Hinze and Russell 2006; Hinze et al. 1998; Suruda et 
al. 1997) of crane accidents have been limited to fatality statistics collected and prepared by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Integrated Management and 
Information System (IMIS). IMIS does not address accident causation and does not contain 
reliable crane accident causation data (Shapria and Lyachin 1997).   
Determination of causes for an incident is a first step in identifying and understanding risks taken 
which led to an accident. Procedures identified by analyses of these risks can reduce the likelihood 
of future accidents. Reactionary methods of addressing accidents, unfortunately, have limited 
effect in reducing the likelihood of future accidents (Häkkinen 1993). According to Häkkinen 
(1993), a large database providing analyses of causes for crane accidents and methods by which 
accidents can be prevented, based upon noted hazards, risks taken, and other accident triggers, can 
be effective in ensuring the implementation of deliberate measures to reduce accidents. 
Organizations strive for performance, both production and safety (Kannan et al. 2016). A large 
comprehensive database provides guidance for academic research.  Incident databases are the core 
for building the data analysis tree (Kannan et al. 2016). 
This study highlights safety strategies that may be utilized to develop crane lift planning 
practices which use hazards identification and responsibility assignments for each hazard. 
Furthermore, throughout Chapter 1, the researcher has identified common crane hazards and 
discusses duties and responsibilities of associated crane lift personnel. Information developed 
during forensic engineering analyses of crane accident causes and associated determinations of the 
duties and responsibilities of personnel, can be used to address common hazards and improve 
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safety. Chapter 1 also highlights critical information which has guided the researcher during his 
development of the research vision and research questions. 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Cranes are evolving tools used in many industries which enable workers to lift ever heavier 
loads to greater heights. While there are benefits associated with greater lifting and reach ability, 
the complexity of projects and jobsite concerns must be taken into account when cranes are 
employed. Increasing crane performance and complexity potentially can expose jobsite workers 
to new hazards each of which must be identified and resolved prior to lift initiation. Jobsite workers 
are exposed to potentially new hazardous conditions with increased complexity, which must be 
identified and resolved prior to initiating a lift (Raviv, Shapira, and Fishbain 2017). 
Neitzel et al. (2001) observed that crane accidents occur fairly often on construction 
projects. In fact, as many as one-third of all construction and maintenance injuries and fatalities 
involve cranes (Neitzel et al. 2001). Despite high rates of crane-related injuries and fatalities in the 
construction industry, Veazie et al. (1994) identified a scarcity of epidemiological studies of 
construction accidents and highlighted the fact that that even fewer studies have identified causes 
of crane-related accidents.  This study provide research based on a large database which allows for 
more in-depth analysis and interactions of data. 
  Prior experience can be key to preparing for the future (Häkkinen 1993). Researchers and 
practitioners should examine in detail those causes of past accidents. Much can be learned from 
past mistakes. When accurate identifications of factors contributing to accidents are documented 
and understood, preventative procedures (i.e., certifications, risk recognition risk correction, and 
safety trainings) will be more effective (Hinze and Russell 2006). The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) has collected considerable data regarding crane-related accidents 
and assimilated it into the Integrated Management Information System (IMIS). IMIS provides 
information regarding construction related fatality statistics but no information regarding accident 
causation. Despite a thorough review of databases and research publications, the researcher has 
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confirmed that there is no database available which addresses causation. Causation information 
would be extremely valuable in identifying hazards associated with crane accidents. 
The researcher of this study has utilized forensic accident analysis method to assist in the 
development of crane related protocol suggestions which if implemented in the field should 
decrease the likelihood of accident and consequent injuries, deaths, and property damage. This 
study addresses the database information gap using data derived from forensic analyses of causes 
for crane-related accidents, incorporating the duties and responsibilities of lift personnel as 
specified by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME B30.5), and utilizing both 
knowledge and experience regarding crane safety programs/plans to provide a detailed account of 
the causal factors for crane accidents. The researcher’s goal for carrying out this study was to 
provide a detailed account of the causal factors related to crane accidents. Utilizing data collected 
by this researcher doing analyses of 701 crane accidents over a 30-year period, the researcher seeks 
to enhance all fields of construction, particularly the crane industry, by providing valuable 
information regarding why crane accidents occur and recommendations regarding crane accident 
prevention.  
1.2 MOTIVATING CASES 
The researcher spent the first years of his professional career working in a family 
construction business. The researcher has owned and operated cranes and this experience instilled 
great respect for the lifting processes and enhanced his knowledge regarding hazards associated 
with cranes. A desire to improve crane safety operations was advanced further during the 
researcher’s subsequent years as a forensic engineer. As a forensic engineer, he has analyzed a 
continuing series of crane failures. Beginning in the late 1980s, the researcher has collected data 
during forensic evaluations of more than 1,000 crane accidents and has analyzed crane safety 
issues which led to those accidents. The researcher’s interest in this topic has also been enhanced 




1.2.1 Don Dickie Seminar 
In 1987, the researcher attended a Construction Safety Association of Ontario (CSAO) 
seminar during which Mr. Don Dickie provided details and data related to crane accidents, having 
collected that information during a study in 1983. During the seminar, Mr. Dickie detailed 
procedures based upon the findings of his comprehensive research study which could improve 
crane safety standards. The ability to identify key issues that contribute or cause crane accidents 
and the ability to address them by reinforcing simple procedures is effective and realistic plus it 
was an intriguing approach to risk analysis. 
Mr. Dickie is a world-renowned leader who possesses expert-level knowledge related to 
cranes and crane safety. Dickie has published three books regarding cranes, rigging, planning, and 
responsibilities associated with the implementation of crane safety guidelines. These publications 
are entitled the Crane Handbook, the Mobile Crane Manual, and the Rigging Manual. Based on 
his research studies, Dickie reported during the seminar that more than 50% of crane accidents in 
Canada had occurred because outriggers were not deployed. Dickie emphasized that by mandating 
all cranes have outriggers fully extended prior to initiating any lift, there probably would be a great 
reduction in the numbers of crane accidents. The use of known, precise data and employing 
procedures neither complicated nor restrictive would eliminate many crane accidents. This simple 
fact inspired this researcher to use data regarding crane accidents collected throughout the years, 
to determine reasons why accidents occur and to offer guidelines to prevent future accidents. 
1.2.2 Tower Crane Collapse San Francisco  
On November 28, 1989, in San Francisco, a tower crane collapsed during a jacking 
sequence. This collapse resulted in 5 fatalities and 22 injuries (fatalities of 4 workers and 1 
pedestrian; injury information is not segregated according to group type). As a result of this 
tragedy, the Construction Division of the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) appointed 
a Task Committee to examine and comment on construction site crane safety. The Task Committee 
focused on the following: 1) crane design, 2) crane manufacturing, 3) transportation, erection, and 
the dismantling of cranes, 4) training and licensing of operators/riggers, 5) supervision and 
5 
 
management of crane operations at construction sites, and 6) responsibilities of  project owners or 
public agencies, the consultants, general contractors, crane manufacturers, crane owners, lessees, 
and regulatory agencies (Sale 1998). 
That ASCE Task Committee, analyses and the OSHA investigation determined that 
workers involved in the tower crane jumping process (i.e., when height of a tower crane is 
extended) had neither formal nor informal instruction or other directives as to their individual 
duties or job tasks (OSHA, Report May 1990). Insufficient and even an absence of instruction or 
other directive on crane sites has not been uncommon in the crane industry. In this instance, 
however, due to the loss of lives and the multiple injuries that resulted from this San Francisco 
tower crane collapse, the lack of adequate instruction (i.e. what are your responsibilities?) provided 
to personnel working with the crane became an important area of focus for the ASCE Task 
Committee and a solid foundation for research development.  
These findings by OSHA and the subsequent ASCE evaluation regarding this issue were 
published many years after Mr. Dickie had introduced the ambiguity/lack of knowledge associated 
with worker duties and responsibilities. Mr. Dickie’s crane publications were available in the 
early/mid 1970s and identified those personnel and their responsibilities necessary to assure 
effective and safe crane lifts. Unfortunately, despite assessments by Dickie in the 1970s and the 
tragedy of the 1989 collapse, it was not until 1998 that ASCE published a list of the duties and 
responsibilities for all parties involved in crane lifts as part of the Task Committee report. 
Subsequently, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) published ASME B30 - 
Safety Standard for Cableways, Cranes, Derricks, Hoists, Hooks, Jacks, and Slings, a national 
consensus standard.  ASME B30.5 – Mobile and Locomotive Cranes in 2007 listed personnel 
duties and responsibilities. Understanding processes of risk identification, crane accident cause 
determination, and the assignment of tasks/duties to personnel which address those issues, forms 
the foundation for this research study. 
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1.2.3 ASCE Report 93 
The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), supports efforts in the construction 
industry to promote and specify safety improvements.  Sale et al. (1994) notes that the goals of the 
policy created by the ASCE includes the following: 
1. Protect the public during crane operations. 
2. Assigns the Contractor the primary responsibility for construction site safety, 
specifically including the management of crane operations. 
3. Require the Contractor to develop site safety plans including a Crane Safety Program. 
4. Encourage manufacturers to standardize load chart formats and equipment control 
configurations, with all manuals written in the language and vernacular of the end user 
in addition to SI units and containing detailed explanatory graphics. 
5. Establish a program of crane operation certification that meets the following criteria: 
a. National in scope and implemented by the private sector 
b. Industrial relations neutral 
c. Re-certifiable, renewable, equipment specific with periodic testing 
6. Recognize the critical role of the rigging function in the safe operation of cranes and 
clearly define rigging responsibilities. 
7. Introduce training in crane safety management for Contractors staff and job site 
personnel. 
8. Encourage the inclusion of courses for the safe utilization of cranes and rigging in 
College and University Civil Engineering Construction and/or Continuing Education 
Programs. 
ASCE Manuals and Reports on Engineering Practice No. 93, Crane Safety on Construction 
Sites, identified the parties who are integral to crane lifts and specified that these individuals must 
be trained to plan and conduct crane lifts in the safest manner possible. Furthermore, the ASCE 
encouraged institutions of higher education to create college level courses, in the field of in Civil 
Engineering, which are dedicated to the management of cranes, as well as address the proper steps 
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associated with rigging safety. The development and implementation of crane programs are an 
integral element in controlling, directing, and successfully completing a safe crane lift.  Critical 
hazards addressed in a crane program must be understood and followed. The ASCE publication 
was the first in-depth analysis of duties and responsibilities in the United States and served as a 
model for ASME and their ultimate production of the standard. 
1.2.4 Intricacies of Crane Lift Operations 
Cranes, both mobile and static, are mechanical devices that rely on leverage and balance 
between the loads and the counterweight to lift, move, and place those loads. Cranes are used in 
virtually every industry around the world and are critical and indispensable tools for the dynamic 
and continually changing nature of construction. Despite the utilization of cranes in almost all 
industries around the world, humans operate those cranes, meaning that human intervention is 
necessary to rig loads, signal crane maneuvers, operate the crane itself, and carry out safety 
measures which ensure that tasks are completed properly. Proper lift planning requires the person 
directing the operation understand lift risks, know how to address potential hazards, and 
communicate that knowledge regarding risks, hazards, and safety requirements to members of the 
lift crew. Interactions among personnel involved in lifts requires planning, training, and 
collaboration. Each person must perform his or her duties and execute assigned responsibilities 
correctly. The 1989 tower crane collapse demonstrated how the lack of training and not 
understanding duties and responsibilities can result in tragedy. 
Crane operations are unique because multiple parties, in addition to the operator, play 
integral roles in planning and conducting all aspects of lifts. Personnel are involved from the 
inception of a lift (e.g., planning, rigging, and conducting) to the completion of the lift process.  
When crane intricacies are ignored and feedback from individuals is not evaluated, accidents often 
result. Understanding all elements, responsibilities, and risks of a lift are necessary in determining 
causes of crane accidents.  
The National Safety Council’s (NSC 2009) publication titled the Accident Prevention 
Manual for Business & Industry (13th ed.), has attributed 90% of mobile crane injuries to “operator 
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error” despite the fact that it provides no definition of operator error (Neitzel et al. 2011). 
Additionally, the Thomas-Howell Group (based in London) regularly investigated crane accidents 
worldwide. The Thomas-Howell Group revealed that more than 80% of the 70 crane accidents 
investigated over a three-year period, were operator error (Sale et al. 1998). Attributing the 
majority of crane failures to operator error has led to repeated failures to conduct in-depth 
examinations of the fundamental causes of crane accidents. Furthermore, by failing to understand 
detailed reasons for these failures accidents continue to occur (Neitzel et al. 2001). By analyzing 
the conduct of parties responsible for crane accidents, a procedure previously not carried out, the 
researcher has been able to associate causes of these accidents based on documented 
responsibilities. This procedure has included evaluations of assigned and documented 
responsibilities and assisted in creating much safer worksites.   
1.2.5 Crane Study Evolution 
Over a period of 30 years, the researcher has analyzed more than 1000 crane accidents and 
accumulated specific data compiled from those accidents to analyze accident details and develop 
evaluations of contributing factors. Specifically, the researcher has examined the effectiveness of 
assigned duties and responsibilities of parties involved in crane lifts. The researcher has qualified 
in both state and federal courts as an expert in crane-related accident causation analysis. 
Furthermore, the researcher has been offered as a testifying expert for over 130 trials in the United 
States, to present his knowledge and expertise regarding crane-related accidents analysis and to 
assist in explaining all aspects of crane accidents.   
The researcher also has worked as a member of the national consensus standards committee 
(ASME B30) and certification program development with the National Commission for the 
Certification of Crane Operators (NCCCO) for Operators, Riggers, Signalpersons, and Lift 
Directors. The researcher possesses recognized crane accident analysis knowledge/experience and 
a strong understanding of the development of national consensus standards and certification 
programs.  These skills have provided a unique insight regarding accident causations, particularly 
the interactions of parties involved in these accidents.   
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 Accident data initially were accumulated using standard forensic accident analysis 
techniques for causation determination. The data included physical characteristics of the sites, 
crane, load and rigging, weather, location (i.e., address, city, and state) and time of the incidents, 
all standard background information. Ultimate development of primary and secondary study 
attributes (essential key information) evolved over time and included all potential accident 
scenarios. Input from Subject Matter Experts from the crane industry also has been included.  
Crane accidents were evaluated both immediately following the incident and, in some cases, 
months, even years later. Timing resulted in the accumulation of different types of key information 
when there was no site inspection. Before including information regarding some particular 
incident, the researcher applied previously developed procedures which addressed a minimum 
number of primary sources of information. Detailed discussions of crane study attributes are 
included in Chapter 3. 
Analyses of some incidents have required several years of information gathering; other 
incident analyses were completed quite quickly. As of January 1, 2018, there have been more than 
1,000 crane accidents analyzed during the 30-year period of this study. One hundred and twenty 
of the evaluations have been set aside since adequate information could not be developed to meet 
an acceptable level of evaluation. Seven hundred and one (701) evaluations are complete and 
incorporated within this study. The remaining data, not included in the 701 cases analyzed, are at 
various stages of information gathering.  
The analysis of data gathered during crane accident evaluations over the 30-year period is 
a unique and strong method for developing crane safety plans, determining realistic risk 
assessments, and carrying out necessary safety training based on appropriate analytic evaluations.  
A thorough analysis of compiled data (database) provided a proactive approach to identifying the 
diverse spectra of associated hazards common elements/factors that have contributed to these crane 
incidents. Implementation of corrective actions can be more precise and detailed based on the large 
number of similar accidents evaluated.  
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1.3 VISION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The researcher has sought to accumulate accurate information regarding specific crane 
accidents and the causes of those accidents using a methodology consistent with provisions of 
ASME B30.5 standards (developed in 2007) regarding the duties and responsibilities of personnel 
associated with crane operations at jobsites. By compiling this information into a large 
comprehensive database, the researcher hopes to provide information that will permit and 
encourage further analytical exploration of crane related accident information. Available 
information currently is incomplete with regard to causation, duties and responsibilities. Research 
questions (provided subsequently) guided the researcher while analyzing the available data, and 
also accounts for the gap in research regarding crane accident causation, as well as the need for 
additional research exploration. 
1.3.1 Research Question 1 
RQ1: Do the duties and responsibilities established by ASME B30.5 appropriately address 
associated causes of crane accidents by all responsible parties? 
This first research question seeks to determine whether duties and responsibilities listed in 
ASME B30.5 address all causal factors that have contributed to crane accidents. While analyzing 
and examining crane related accidents, the researcher has determined that very few accidents have 
been due to direct mechanical failures and/or manufacturing defects. In fact, of the 701 crane 
related accidents reported in this study, only seven percent were due to mechanical/manufacturing 
issues. The other 93 percent were due to lift crew or jobsite personnel mistakes. 
The ASME 30.5 (2007) document, approved and adopted more than ten years ago, has 
served as a guide to assist personnel in implementing proper procedures and protocol by which to 
mitigate inherent risks on the job sites. To ensure proper analysis of the data in order to answer 
RQ1, the researcher compared the assigned responsibility failures which led to each accident with 
the standards created by ASME. This comparison process evaluated the completeness of the 
standard and led to identifications, based on study findings, of other parties potentially responsible. 
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 In addition to creating RQ1, the researcher has developed a sub question related to study 
findings that suggests additional responsible parties and responsibilities.   
RQ1A: Should the list of duties and responsibilities be amended to include additional 
parties and corresponding responsibilities? Research findings identified several repeatable 
causative factors that suggest addition to the current responsibilities are warranted. Particularly, 
where consistent injuries have arisen during a specific lifting procedure. 
1.3.2 Research Question 2 
RQ2: How can the use of crane accident causation factors assist and improve the 
development of more effective risk management strategies to improve crane safety? 
The large database compiled by the researcher provides extensive information regarding 
the specific causes of the analyzed crane accidents. This large database provides consistency and 
improves data integrity when an analyst is performing evaluations of specific causes of crane 
accidents. The evaluation of a single accident provides information based on that particular event; 
analyses of multiple similar accidents, under varying conditions, can help in the identification of 
common risks that otherwise might have been overlooked by crane accident investigation 
personnel. Evaluation of this large database provides great insight into initiating and contributing 
factors and into key risk factors and potential trends associated with crane accidents.   
1.4 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The researcher has compiled data during a 30-year period into a single Microsoft Excel 
document. This document includes information reported by forensic analysts regarding 701 crane 
accidents. Subsequently, the data was imported into SPSS for final analyses. Each accident 
analysis involved 57 specific items of input, as listed in Appendix A. These 57 specific items of 
input are in addition to evaluations of other issues that caused or contributed to each incident.  
Through utilizing multinomial regression, the researcher has identified key risk areas and patterns 
in the data, thereby exposing common factors which contribute to crane incidents.   
 Incorporated statistical data identifies parties responsible for crane accidents and compares 
the causes of the accidents to the list of duties for involved personnel in lifting operations as 
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prescribed by ASME B30.5. The researcher developed a theoretical lift plan by identifying all 
parties involved in lift planning in order to understand the multiple personnel that are involved in 
planning and execution of a lift. Based upon a comparison of the statistical significance of the 
independent variables in the multinomial regression and the risk ratios, the researcher has 
identified several additional areas of responsibility that have been directly causative of crane 
accidents. These additional areas of responsibility currently are not included in the ASME B30.5 
standard. 
  A second examination of the data involved searching for causes of those accidents which 
resulted in the greatest number of injuries and fatalities and association of the responsible parties.  
The most frequently encountered initiating and contributing causes of accidents were categorized 
in order to document high-risk factors, both initiating and contributing. This information 
categorization procedure limits or eliminates misidentified accident causation factors and assists 
in the development of training programs.  
1.5 READER’S GUIDE TO THIS DISSERTATION  
 This dissertation has five chapters. Chapter 1 provides general information regarding the 
topic being explored, what has motivated this topic exploration, the research vision, and associated 
research questions. Chapter 2 explains the background literature, including peer-reviewed journal 
articles, trade publications, and books to provide the reader with a thorough understanding of 
cranes, crane legislation, causes of crane accidents, and gaps in the crane literature. Chapter 3 
offers details regarding methodology used to analyze the data. Chapter 4 discusses the research 
findings and information regarding the various statistical analyses of the study’s research 




Chapter 2 – Inherent Risks in the Crane Industry: A Risk Generation and 
Control Model 
Chapter 2 presents information regarding the inherent risks associated with crane 
operations, crane accident data available in the industry, current training and programs offered to 
Crane Operators/personnel to mitigate future risks, and a theoretical overview of the process of lift 
plan development. As noted in literature, one of the most critical and often most dangerous aspects 
of construction projects involves lifting materials and equipment.   
Multiple trades are involved in rigging, signaling, and operating cranes in order to achieve 
successful lifts. To properly train personnel associated with lifts, reliable information and 
processes must be disseminated to highlight the roles of all individuals involved in lifting 
operations. Although the general practice of planning, rigging, and lifting a load is similar in 
virtually all industries, site conditions and training processes vary between industries.  
2.1 HAZARDS OF A CHANGING WORK ENVIRONMENT  
In 2001, Neitzel, Seixas, and Ren of the University of Washington (UW), published a 
journal article titled A Review of Crane Safety in the Construction Industry. This publication 
provided information regarding crane-related injuries, available safety devices to prevent 
accidents/injuries, and other information regarding commonly utilized crane safety procedures. 
Authors of this journal article concluded that construction work differs from work in industrial 
settings in that construction workers often encounter challenges and dangers that change as the 
project progresses. It is common within a typical industrial setting for workers to experience the 
same environment and hazards on a daily basis; however, a construction worker may work for 
multiple employers and on multiple contracted projects. These changes increase job complexity. 
Neitzel et al. (2001) reported that crane accidents are common on construction projects and that as 
many as one-third of all construction and maintenance fatalities and injuries involve cranes. 
Without accurate information and data regarding risks that cause or contribute to these accidents, 
the success of any crane safety program is diminished. By conducting a thorough analysis of 
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hazards attributable to accident causation, more effective and more concentrated efforts become 
available which should reduce the occurrence of crane-related accidents. Despite the high fatality 
and injury rates in the construction industry, Veazie et al. (1994) identified a scarcity of 
epidemiological construction research and highlighted that there are even fewer studies which 
specify the causes of crane-related accidents.  
The identification and assessment of hazards and risks in any work environment is an 
essential first step in safety management (Brown 1976; Goetsch 1996; Holt 2001). However, 
differences between construction sites and industrial/manufacturing facilities dictate specialized 
methods of assessing hazards and risks at construction sites (Rozenfeld et al. 2010). Construction 
sites are dynamic (Bobick 2004) with many unique factors. Construction sites change continuously 
in topography, topology and work conditions throughout project duration (Rozenfeld et al. 2009). 
Additionally, construction projects experience frequent work team rotations, exposure to weather 
conditions, and high percentages of unskilled and temporary workers. These site variables tend to 
make managing site-safety more difficult than managing manufacturing plant safety programs 
(Rozenfeld et al. 2010). Timing the application of specific site safety measures in direct response 
to risk levels (Sacks et al. 2005) are critical when specific expected risks are about to develop 
(Rozenfeld et al. 2006). Long-range safety planning on most job sites can become generic over 
time due to repetition. In contrast, crane lifts are normally planned events typically scheduled to 
correspond to the task. 
Jarasunas (1984a; 1984b) has studied causes of and ways to prevent crane accidents. In his 
1984 study, Jarasunas cautioned against relying too heavily on placing reliance on cooperation and 
training of the employees to accomplish accident prevention. Further, Jarasunas (1984b) concluded 
the best way to make equipment as safe as possible is by means of technological advancement.  
Data reported initially in this researcher’s study indicate that 93% of those crane accidents 
analyzed involved some type of direct human error. Furthermore, preliminary analyses have 
reinforced a general conclusion that caused a majority of the crane-related accidents have 
personnel other than the Crane Operator (i.e., Lift Director, Rigger, Signal Person, and Site 
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Supervisor). Of the accidents caused by human error, operator error resulted in 26% of the 
accidents. Other crane personnel (i.e., Lift Director, Rigger, Signal Person, and Site Supervisor) 
caused 67% of the accidents reported while the remaining 7% are mechanical related. Although 
advancements in technology can assist in reducing some potential operator error issues, proper 
project planning can yield immediate and strong dedication to training those persons not at the 
crane controls (i.e., Lift Directors, Riggers, and Site Supervisors). Coordination between 
Operators, Lift Directors, Riggers, and Signal Persons are crucial. Given the findings that only 
26% of crane-related accidents were caused by operator errors, it is clear that while the Crane 
Operator does control the load during a lift, there are many others involved in a lift who can have 
adverse effects on success of lifts.   
Technology cannot address the ever-changing environmental factors that impact lifts. Each 
lift is different and is influenced by varying factors that are continuously changing. These changing 
environmental factors are particularly true when a Service Provider is involved in a crane project. 
(ASCE defines a Service Provider as the party responsible for bringing the crane and operator onto 
the site and controlling crane operations.) A Service Provider (or crane rental company) is exposed, 
in many cases, to constantly changing work environments and more important, lifting crews (i.e., 
Lift Directors, Riggers, and Signal Persons), that change with each lift and sometimes with 
industry sectors. It is the responsibility of the Lift Director to conduct pre-lift meetings and discuss 
the roles and responsibilities of all parties prior to lift initiation. The Crane Operator employed by 
a Service Provider must rely on other site personnel to analyze properly the lifting procedure, to 
determine weight of the load, to select and install, to direct rigging methods which assure load 
stability, to signal (guide) the operator around obstruction(s) for final load placement; and to ensure 
the landing area is both stable and structurally capable of supporting or bracing the load to be 
placed. 
Preliminary study results suggest that since implementation of the Crane Operator 
certification (in 1995), operator-caused crane accidents have declined steadily. While this finding 
may be crane-related to factors outside of the scope of this study, it appears that there is a 
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correlation between training received and decreased lift accidents. As technology continues to 
advance, training and certification offerings must keep pace with new hazards that can arise due 
to technological advancements. Although the role of the operator remains critical to the ultimate 
success of any lift, parties other than the operator are responsible for background preparation, lift 
development processes, and other aspects of the lift.   
Crane accidents cause property damage, injuries, fatalities, and garner negative publicity 
(Hinze and Russel 2006). Job Safety Analyses (JSA) and Job Hazard Analyses (JHA), anticipation, 
and hazard avoidance can reduce greatly the likelihood of accidents. The analysis of specific job 
tasks using JSA/JHA procedures help integrate accepted safety and health principles and practices 
into specific tasks and job operations, including crane lifts (Rozenfeld et al. 2010).   
A JSA is based on three parts: 1) job step; 2) hazard; and 3) control (Markiewicz 2009).   
Each basic step of a job must be detailed; hazards must be identified, and controls must be 
implemented to address the hazards/risks. Unfortunately, JSAs often become mechanical and 
routine, particularly because so many of the tasks are discussed repeatedly. In some instances, 
JSAs are applied for long periods of time (e.g., during erection of steel framing of a large building).  
Although unique practices and environmental conditions develop throughout the duration of a 
project, the same JSAs remain in effect since these JSAs address the overall safety analysis. For 
example, if a steel erection company has a JSA in place for erecting steel during windy conditions, 
that standard is applied. However, when winds are high, standard applications are not discussed 
and a disconnect between operator/project personnel develops. If JSAs are utilized, it is important 
that they be understood and applied to meet the situation actually at hand. Too often, though, JSAs 
are lumped together to address issues rather than to account for factors that necessitated JSAs be 
used. 
The importance of JSAs and JHAs cannot be over-emphasized. It is incumbent upon safety 
and lift planning personnel to analyze and address serious hazards. A drawback of existing 
methods of risk assessment in construction (Jannadi and Almishari 2003; Yi and Langford 2006; 
Wang and Boukamp 2007) is that they do not account explicitly for the fact that on construction 
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sites, workers not only endanger themselves and other workers, they also may endanger others not 
involved in the work (Rozenfeld et al. 2009). The basic situation remains as expressed by 
MacCollum (1993): 
Serious injury or death that occurs repeatedly from similar circumstances should be 
considered epidemic. These occurrences should be examined to identify hazards so that 
appropriate hazard prevention measures can be initiated in the same diligent manner that 
the medical profession examines a disease or infection to develop a vaccine or antibiotic 
for its prevention or control (p. 1). 
2.2 AVAILABLE DATABASES 
Since 1971, OSHA has collected data obtained through inspection procedures and reports 
of accidents associated with fatalities and injuries. OSHA has categorized this information and has 
analyzed raw data to assist safety professionals, as well as industry leaders, to understand why 
accidents occur as well as to develop training programs to prevent future accidents. Accident 
prevention is the most effective when based upon the issues experienced during prior events.  
Accidents increase awareness and proper evaluations can provide further understanding of what 
went wrong/what caused an accident. Understanding what caused an accident is critical in ensuring 
that implemented measures and initiatives (i.e., training and protocol implementation) will prevent 
future accidents (Beavers et al. 2006; Hinze and Russell 2006).  
OSHA’s data, incorporated into the Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) 
database, has been the primary (if not sole) source of accident studies throughout the past three 
decades. IMIS data has limitations since it reports only fatalities and serious injuries. Less severe 
injuries (injuries that do not involve hospitalization or lost work time) and property damage are 
not reported by OSHA to IMIS. IMIS input provides the following information about each 
incident: location, date, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), type of citation, abatement status, 
amount assessed for the penalty, a brief description (e.g., abstract) of the accident, information 
about the injured worker (i.e., age, severity of injury, sex, etc.), and factors contributing to the 
accident (i.e., environmental conditions, hazards, and human factors). As noted by Hinze and 
Russell (2016), while the database includes information from all workplace industries, it does not 
specifically identify accidents associated with cranes and lifting. The system is set up to provide 
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information of value only to OSHA. As a result of missing information, the data cannot be sorted 
easily, and those responsible for input are not trained to input consistently the properly coded 
information into the system (Hinze and Russell 2016). OSHA utilizes over 450 codes to report 
accidents, thereby increasing greatly the difficulty of proper coding. This difficulty is compounded 
further because no two codes are the same, and all codes are complex.    
Although pertinent information is available through IMIS regarding causes of injuries, the 
information is too generic to offer meaningful data to assist in developing and determining accident 
prevention programs (Hinze et al. 1998). Information collected by OSHA compliance officers 
generally consists of a brief narrative of the incident with some recorded in assigned code 
categories. The five categories most commonly used by OSHA compliance officers highlight the 
following types of accidents: falls, struck-by, caught in/between, electric shock, and other.  These 
code descriptions are simple but do not describe the root causes of the accidents. Furthermore, 
these codes are too broad in scope to describe clearly the specific causes of accidents and many 
accidents cannot be described clearly based on this restricted code system (Hinze et al. 1998).  
In a 1997 study, Suruda et al. described two main limitations associated with of OSHA 
data. The first is that the numbers of OSHA-investigated crane-related deaths in construction is 
unknown. Furthermore, details available for analysis in the OSHA report summaries are varied.  
Sometimes, the electronic reports provided by OSHA are incomplete. A second limitation of the 
OSHA data is that the electronic summary reports vary by types of incident. For instance, reports 
of deaths involving crane assembly or disassembly do not include crane specifics (i.e., a hydraulic 
crane, a lattice-boom crane, or a tower crane).   
Shapira and Lyachin (1997) suggested not utilizing OSHA’s statistical data because so 
many incidents go unreported, because the information does not include root causes of the 
incidents or statistics regarding accident prediction. The researcher of this study determined that 
statistics regarding construction accidents involving cranes could have been a reliable source of 
information for this study. Unfortunately, statistical information accumulated by OSHA failed to 
identify types of cranes involved in the accidents (i.e., mobile cranes, tower cranes, etc.). Shapria 
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and Lyachin (1997) also found that crane accidents commonly were reported only in cases of 
fatalities or severe injuries. Sale et al. (1998) observed that numerous incidents simply were not 
included in the statistics, even those incidents reported by the companies responsible. Cases 
analyzed in this study may involve minor injuries or “only” property damages. Such incidents 
constitute the majority of crane-crane-related accidents, and the failure to include such accidents 
reduces greatly the information needed for the ASCE study. All in all, crane-related accidents are 
subject to gross under-reporting or reporting that lacks detail (Butler 1978; McDonald and Hrymak 
2002).   
Beavers et al. (2006) concluded that OSHA does not yet have effective tools, data entry 
forms, training programs, or quality control systems in place to help Compliance Safety and Health 
Officers (CSHOs) to code accident information consistently and accurately or to enter inspection 
data into IMIS. Furthermore, there is little formal guidance for CSHOs to write abstracts 
effectively or to capture key factors that may have contributed to the fatality or injury. Data 
gathering process gaps/issues create voids in the reported information, and there is no standardized 
narrative utilized by the CSHOs. Beavers et al. (2006) concluded that the primary purpose of 
OSHA investigations was to determine what standards were violated, not to determine the causes 
of the accidents. 
2.3 USE OF EXPERTS FOR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
While the IMIS statistical data provides limited information regarding the root causes of 
accidents, data available regarding crane accident specifics remain incomplete. Fatality statistics 
not classified according to industry sectors or types of cranes involved in accidents are all that is 
available to researchers. For data analyses of crane accidents to be detailed and reliable, it is 
necessary that a large database with in-depth information/data be provided regarding initiating and 
contributing causes of crane accidents. Past crane accident researchers have encountered similar 
problems of limited data and have turned to experts in the field to develop information concerning 
hazards (Cho et al. 2002; Lee and Halpin 2003). Harms-Ringdahl (2001) and Rozenfeld et al. 
(2010) maintain that questioning experts about particular procedures or processes is a viable option 
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when no data is available. Obviously, viability demands that experts consulted possess strong 
knowledge attained through education and extensive field experience. Unfortunately, root cause 
data regarding crane accidents is limited or not even available.  This dearth of root cause data limits 
determinations of whether accidents resulted due to failures of personnel to follow recommended 
procedures or due to equipment problems.   
The term accident does not mean that an injury occurred.  In fact, accidents can destroy 
equipment and materials, and cause project delays, recovery costs, and unwanted negative 
publicity. Hinze et al. (1998) explained that individuals often pay much closer attention to 
accidents that cause injuries or deaths. It is critical that professionals planning crane lifts possess 
the knowledge, skill, and ability necessary to identify those risks which might develop thereby 
ensure proper implementation of safety protocol. While organizations continue to implement 
safety strategies, technological advancements/developments have led to increased numbers of 
occupational incidents, many of which have had severe consequences (Hamid and Majid 2008).  
Every industry has unique approaches when determining Crane Operator training 
requirements. Furthermore, given technological advancements and field changes, it often is n 
difficult to hire Crane Operators who are knowledgeable of field changes, compliance standard 
improvements, and so forth. The demands associated with larger loads, greater reaches, and precise 
load placement have mandated crane manufacturers constantly upgrade machine capabilities and 
provide innovative technological advancements for their equipment. The introduction of Finite 
Element Analysis (FEA) techniques has enabled designers to refine their designs by identifying 
high stress areas and modifying their designs to address high stress areas. Similarly, areas with 
lesser stress levels can be reduced in size. The overall effect of FEA processes has been a reduction 
in equipment weights and increased performance. For example, the Construction Safety 
Association of Ontario has demonstrated that as a result of crane design refinements utilizing FEA, 
a crane once rated at 30-ton capacity during the 1960s now has a 50-ton lift capacity rating, thus 
reducing overall weight of the equipment. 
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Crane design innovations, have increased lifting capacities and reach capabilities, enabling 
designers to develop increasingly complicated structures. Design modifications have led to the 
development of extremely large cranes (mega cranes). Advancements made by Deep South Versa-
Crane, Lampson Transi-Lift, and other massive lifting equipment allow industries to accomplish 
what previously was considered impossible. Land-based cranes, with booms longer than 600 feet 
and capacities of 2,500 tons and greater, have become available. Given advancements and 
modifications, designers and developers of these mega-cranes have created specific training 
programs focusing on proper handling methods for large loads and extended reaches. Training for 
handling large loads at extended reaches are not limited to Crane Operators but are also available 
to the entire lifting crew and management team. In order to ensure correct maintenance and to 
uphold safety standards, it is most important that Crane Operators have earned proper certifications 
and the training necessary to operate these large cranes (MacCollum 1993; Neitzel et al. 2001). 
Further, in order to promote crane safety, similar certification programs have been developed for 
Lift Directors, Riggers, and Signal Personnel.   
2.4 REGULATORY AND VOLUNTARY CRANE STANDARDS 
Crane design and crane operations are governed by both regulatory and voluntary 
standards. These play different roles in the crane industry (Neitzel et al. 2001). Regulatory agencies 
disseminate and enforce standards specifying minimum requirements for crane safety operations. 
Conversely, voluntary standard organizations, such as American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI) and ASME B30, promote qualities of excellence exceeding minimum requirements set 
forth by regulatory agencies such as OSHA. In 2010, OSHA amended the crane standard with the 
addition of 29 CFR 1926.1400. This amendment followed several years of discussion/input 
provided by the Crane-Derrick Advisory Committee (C-DAC). 
One of the primary amendments to 29 CFR 1926.1400 was addition of Crane Operator 
certification. With the issue of this OSHA amendment in 2010, all Crane Operators were required 
to obtain Crane Operator certification by a recognized organization such as the National 
Commission for the Certification of Crane Operators (NCCCO), by November 10, 2014. Since 
22 
 
issuance of this amendment, the deadline to obtain this certification has been extended several 
times. In fact, the most recent certification deadline is November 10, 2018.  In part, these 
extensions have come about due to differences between OSHA and crane industry definitions of 
operator classifications. During the public review process of the new 1926.1400 amendment, 
OSHA required that operators be certified for every type of crane that they might operate. NCCCO 
and other organizations, as well as industry leaders, considered the addition of the 1926.1400 
amendment to be burdensome. The opposing argument to OSHA during the appeal of the new 
amendment was that crane type (i.e., crawler, hydraulic, lattice boom, mobile, and tower) should 
be one criterion, and that tonnage and the size of the cranes also should apply. 
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) created the B30 Standards 
Committee, a voluntary consensus national standard organization comprised of 32 sub-
committees/groups. The most commonly referenced section of the B30 standards, B30.5, is 
entitled Mobile and Locomotive Cranes. This section applies to all mobile cranes used in all 
industries. In response to improving crane safety, in 2007, B30.5 was amended to include 
information regarding duties and responsibilities of personnel involved with crane lifts.   
The final responsibility section of B30.5 closely mirrored what originally was proposed by 
the Construction Safety Association of Ontario and ASCE Report 93. The original proposal, 
written by Dickie, evolved from a study concerning Canadian crane accidents. It included a 
thorough risk assessment and has resulted in the identification of roles and responsibilities for 
every member of the lift party.  
2.5 OPERATOR CERTIFICATION 
Training and certification must be ongoing endeavors. Continuation is important to assure 
individuals remain aware of diverse and technically complicated crane designs and possess 
familiarity regarding the complexity of current regulatory and voluntary crane safety standards 
(Neitzel et al. 2001). Conventional training for safety and health personnel rarely addresses cranes 
and crane safety requirements. Additional college-level courses in Civil Engineering, as well as 
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continuing education classes, promote better understanding of the complexities of cranes, lifts, and 
crane designs/operations (Sale et al. 1998).   
Given the complexity of crane designs and operations and the difficulties associated with 
lifting loads at great distances, operators must know operational parameters/specifications for the 
crane they are operating. Throughout the years, it has become increasingly challenging to ensure 
that operators be trained to handle technological advancements in crane design and control (Neitzel 
et al. 2001). During the 1990s, the Specialized Carriers & Riggers Association (SC&RA) 
established the National Commission for the Certification of Crane Operators (NCCCO) to provide 
operator certification to address, among other things, advancements in crane technology. NCCCO 
assembled a team of experts to identify the operator knowledge necessary for safe crane operations.   
To ensure operator knowledge met levels necessary, the NCCCO surveyed/tested 
experienced Crane Operators. This surveying process sought to confirm that Crane Operators 
understood both federal and consensus national standards and could read and understand load 
charts and operation manuals. Testing was segregated according to the various sizes of cranes and 
addressed increased complexities and differences between lattice boom type and hydraulic cranes.  
Once Crane Operators passed the written exam, they were required to complete operational tests 
to ensure they understood crane operations (in regard to crane size and type). When Crane 
Operators successfully completed both parts of the examination, they were awarded their 
certification by the certifying agency. Five years subsequent to earning initial certification, 
recertification would be necessary. 
Recertification tests require operators to demonstrate continued operating proficiency. 
During February 1999, OSHA acknowledged the accredited certification process and signed a 
memorandum of understanding with NCCCO. OSHA has recognized that all certifications 
awarded by NCCCO comply with the new 1926.1400 crane standard. A study conducted by the 
University of Washington (UW) confirmed that the Canadian Province of Ontario had instituted a 
certification program in 1979 to ensure that Crane Operators possessed necessary competencies to 
operate cranes. Results of the UW study have confirmed that fewer crane-crane-related fatalities 
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have occurred in the Canadian construction industry since the institution of this certification 
program. Reportedly, from 1978, the year in which the certification program went into effect, until 
1995, the construction crane fatality rate decreased from 3.59 per year to 1.40 per year. The fewer 
fatalities provides evidence that the certification program has helped reduce the frequency of 
catastrophic accidents (Neitzel et al. 2001). Although the program had been created in Canada 
during 1979, it was not until 1995 that the National Commission for the Certification of Crane 
Operators (NCCCO) initiated the first crane certification program in the United States. 
2.6 CRANE ACCIDENTS AND HUMAN INTERVENTIONS 
Mechanical issues which cause crane accidents are fairly easy to identify (mechanical 
breakdowns, welding failures, etc.) and repairs or modifications must be coordinated through the 
manufacturer. An assessment of crane lift risks requires a complete understanding the effects that 
human intervention and decision making have in the success or failure of lift operations.  
According to Ridley (1986), 99% of all crane accidents are due to unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, 
or both. Examinations of national and consensus standards and of the causes of the 701 crane 
accidents, verified that the following parties and/or factors have responsibilities associated with 
lifts which influence success or failure: Crane Manufacturer, Crane Operator, Lift Director, 
Manufacturer of the Load/Lifting Instructions/Load Connection Points, Maintenance and 
Inspection issues, Other, Owners/Users, Riggers, Service Providers, Signal Persons, and/or Site 
Supervisors. 
The original list of responsibilities derived from Dickie’s research in addition to research 
and input from the ASCE and ASME. During the evaluation process, it became clear that there 
were factors crane-related to lift success or failure that were not under the direct control of 
personnel involved in the lifting process. In addition to the Crane Manufacturer, the manufacturer 
of the load being lifted led persistent problems of lost or unstable loads. Study results identified 
numerous incidents which occurred during the lift when the load suddenly shifted or rotated after 
being lifted. During trial lifts, rigging crews had to determine the center-of-gravity by making 
several rigging changes during trial lifts, and did not hoist the load lifts until it would not shift, 
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rotate or flip. This was most common situation when mechanical equipment was being placed on 
roofs or at great heights in a mechanical room. The researcher of this study believes that 
manufacturing companies that produce a product which must be lifted or placed in tight quarters 
should provide detailed lifting instructions or install lifting lugs (points to attach rigging to the 
equipment). Reliance on field rigging personnel to devise effective rigging to balance a load by 
trial and error determination of the load center-of-gravity created unnecessary risks.  
A second area of risk not covered currently by any responsible party, relates to crane 
inspections. Numerous accidents have occurred immediately following an annual inspection.  Such 
accidents often occur when there are maintenance issues that go unattended (for example, improper 
brake adjustments, excessive wire breaks in the load or boom hoist lines, and even pre-existing 
weld fractures). Inspection firms must be qualified to perform critical conditional surveys and 
inspections to ensure the equipment will operate as intended by the manufacturer. Evaluations of 
these accidents have resulted in the assigned responsibilities, as noted in Tables 1 and 2. 
Table 1: Responsible Party by Category 
 
Of the 701 accidents examined in this study, human interventions caused 651 (92.9%) of 
the incidents. Only 50 (7.1%) of the accidents resulted due to machine mechanical issues. These 




Table 2: Total Crane Accidents: Human Intervention versus Mechanical/Design 
 
 
Preliminary study results clearly indicate human error/intervention is the primary cause of 
crane accidents. By analyzing known human-crane-related factors which contribute to accidents, 
the industry will have a detailed guide which addresses potential risk factors, leading to increased 
project control and improved planning. By comparing known causes of accidents with the duties 
and responsibilities identified by ASME B30.5 (2007), effectiveness and accuracy of the standard 
can be evaluated. The gap in research has resulted because existing databases do not provide 
information required to evaluate effectively the hazards/risks for crane lifts. This limits evaluations 
which would improve lift planning and crane safety. For example, factors crane-related to 
mechanical and inspection issues ultimately were classified as human intervention issues because 
inspectors failed to identify problems with critical components of cranes during annual inspections. 
Despite annual inspections, malfunctions of crane components, which might have occurred in the 
period between inspections, or perhaps were overlooked during the inspection, have resulted in 
accidents and injuries.   
In some instances, assigning duties and responsibilities to parties can be a subjective 
process. For example, there have been numerous instances in which more than one party was 
responsible for an accident. This multiple responsible party situation arose since the duties and 
responsibilities can be assigned to many individuals (see Table 3). In fact, in some cases, three 
separate parties have been identified as being primarily responsible for a single accident. The 
percentage of accidents associated with direct human intervention remains the same when multiple 
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parties are identified as being responsible; however, some variations may exist due to isolated 
subjectivity in the assignment of responsibilities. 
Table 3: Multiple Responsible Parties by Category 
The number of crane accidents reviewed increased as this research study progressed. In 
order to compare operator responsibilities, prior to and after inception of NCCCO, cumulative 
averaging was used to track the results. Each year, the number of accidents associated with each 
responsible party was compared to the total number of accidents evaluated. Cumulative averaging 
indicated apparent effectiveness that implementation of the operator certification program, in 
1995, (Figure 1) had on accidents. Incident causations assigned as operator responsibility, prior to 
1987, were omitted due to limited data availability.  
Figure 1 illustrates that from 1995 to 2017, the frequency of operator responsibility for 
accidents has a downward trend, potentially indicating that more extensive training, as well as 
certification mandates may reduce operator-caused crane accidents. The percentage of operator 
caused crane accidents decreased greatly between 1995 and 2017. In fact, over the course of the 
study period, associated operator accident responsibility decreased to 23 percent based on the latest 
calculations listed in Table 3. When compared to being initially around 30% in 1995, the 
downward trend seems to demonstrate a substantial reduction in operator associated risks as a 
result of the certification process. 
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Figure 1: Operator Responsibility and Trend (1987-2017) 
The statistics also demonstrate that the crane lift processes and resulting accidents are 
influenced heavily by human error. The Crane Operators certification process has shown the great 
potential for success and a corresponding reduction in operator-caused issues over the duration of 
the study. Currently, certifications are available for Riggers, Signal Persons, and Lift Directors, 
individuals who play key roles in lift processes. The Lift Director is a key individual who 
contributes to the success of a lift. The Lift Director coordinates the tasks of the other parties and 
ensures that specific procedures and responsibilities are followed. When examining a similar Lift 
Director Responsibility and Trend analysis, it is clear that the certification implemented in 2017 
was warranted (Figure 2). Communication between the Lift Director and the crew (Crane 
Operator/Rigger) is paramount in ensuring that every specific duty is understood and carried out 
according to the plan. Failure to follow lifting requirements can, and often does, lead to accidents 
and consequent injuries and fatalities. Communication becomes more critical when new members 





Figure 2: Lift Director Responsibility and Trend (1987-2017) 
2.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 It is apparent that the increased responsibilities placed on the Lift Director to coordinate 
and direct lifting operations has had an impact on this position and the necessity for certification.  
The Lift Director must have extended skills as compared to other lift personnel. The slight 
reduction trend in Lift Director assessed responsibility for crane accidents has begun to slightly 
diminish since the announcement of certification for this position in 2010. Crane companies, Crane 
Owners, and Site Supervisors have become aware of the criticality of the Lift Director and have 
worked to assure those duties and responsibilities are being addressed 
 Understanding crane operations and the associated risks has been an ongoing endeavor for 
years. The crane industry has recognized that the operator cannot be responsible for every aspect 
of lift; however, those not directly involved in “pulling the levers” must be made aware of what is 
expected and required of each involved participant in safe lifting procedures. Identifications of 
those duties and training personnel to perform those duties will improve crane lift safety. Through 
training and certification lifting personnel have a more complete understanding of their role and 
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requirements expected of them during the lift. The key is communication between all parties and 






Chapter 3: Assessing the Risks Associated with Crane Lifts: A Mixed 
Method Approach 
The Construction Industry Institute (CII 2007) indicated that construction safety 
performance has stagnated to the point that only marginal improvements have been achieved. CII 
has researched the identification and analysis of near misses to help identify hazardous conditions 
and unsafe work practices before they occur. Further, communication was cited by CII as the 
greatest enabler, including feedback from workers that was found to enhance safety.  
This chapter suggests an innovative approach that can be utilized to analyze crane hazards 
and accident causes based upon the identification of parties responsible for project errors/failures. 
Application of this technique should enhance accident prevention. As detailed in Chapter 2, human 
error caused 92.9% of the 701 crane accidents that have been analyzed, thereby reinforcing the 
importance of understanding human errors and failures. In addition to the influence of human error, 
in regard to crane accidents, investigators have identified that operator error has caused many crane 
accidents, which is an inaccurate conclusion.  
Numerous personnel have been involved in procedures that required successful completion 
to ensure crane lift success. In order to understand all aspects of lifting operations, the researcher 
deemed it necessary to examine crane lift planning stages and to analyze the roles and 
responsibilities of all persons involved, as well as the contributions of each to the lift process (both 
primary or secondary). Don Dickie used a process of assigning duties and responsibilities of parties 
as part of accident analysis that was used by this researcher. This similarity allowed the 
introduction into this study of duties and responsibilities for crane personnel first introduced in the 
1970s. During discussions with Mr. Dickie, this researcher learned that the approach utilized 
initially by Mr. Dickie was developed from feedback received from various trade union personnel, 
as well as from examining the corresponding training manuals used by union personnel. 
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Understanding the intricacies of crane lifts and the responsibilities of the associated workers is 
essential to any study geared to reduce the frequency of and potentially eliminate future crane 
accidents. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Cranes are as unique and fascinating as the accidents which occur when crane operations 
do not go as planned. The purpose of this study has been to evaluate a broad cross section of 
accidents which have happened throughout the United States and accumulate information which 
will provide the crane industry with a reference which lists those factors which have caused 
accidents. Furthermore, by developing a broad understanding of these accidents. The researcher 
also has provided recommendations for assigning duties and responsibilities to personnel involved 
in crane lifts as another aid in preventing future accidents. The findings and recommendations 
presented within this study, it is believed, can be of great value to Crane Owners, users, 
manufacturers, and standards committees and will allow these groups to reduce crane related risks 
in the future.   
Prior studies reviewed by the researcher relied almost exclusively on statistical data 
published by OSHA (IMIS). These data are useful but often omit crucial causation information.  
While conducting this study, the researcher reviewed more than 200 OSHA files, almost all of 
which lacked causation details. The purpose of OSHA investigations is to determine which 
regulations were violated within the employer/employee relationship, not to determine the cause(s) 
of accidents. In contrast, evaluations in this study are comprehensive analyses of accident 
causation.   
In addition to reviewing OSHA investigation files and evaluating factors causative of the 
incidents, the researcher has analyzed the responsibilities of involved parties as identified in 
ASME 30.5 standard. Other available research does not differentiate between industries, instead 
they combine data into general use categories, thereby implying that crane applications are similar 
in all industries. During the analysis phase of this study, it became clear that there are considerable 
differences in crane lift applications between industry sectors. The researcher therefore has sought 
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to provide information about crane related accidents in different industries and different 
applications and thereby offer a thorough evaluation of causal factors associated with all types of 
crane accidents. 
3.2 BACKGROUND RESEARCH 
The researcher became interested in cranes at a young age while working in his family’s 
construction business. The why’s and how’s associated with accident occurrences became 
increasingly important after his professional career in forensic engineering began. Furthermore, 
after being exposed to many types of crane accidents and evaluating the causes of those accidents, 
the researcher realized he wanted to share his experience and knowledge with the construction 
community. In order to share his experience, the researcher became involved in the national 
consensus standard development committee (ASME B30).  He also assisted in the development of 
testing guidelines to be used by Crane Operators, Riggers, and Lift Directors through involvement 
with NCCCO. Ultimately, it became obvious to the researcher that the information being gathered 
during inspections, analyses, and reporting processes could benefit the industry if that information 
could be compiled into a comprehensive database. 
 Data derived during evaluations of the 701 crane accidents considered in this study became 
the basis of detailed accident causation analysis. The researcher examined all accident data utilized 
in this study and had teams of forensic engineers with crane industry expertise also evaluate the 
information. Information regarding each of the 701 crane accidents was screened to identify: the 
types of work being performed, the numbers and kinds of cranes being used, the lifts being 
performed, and the natures of the accidents that occurred (i.e., boom collapse, overturn, rigging 
failure, etc.). These evaluations identified accident causation factors and responsible parties in 
accordance with the ASME B30-2007 guidelines. While other data concerning crane-related 
accidents have been collected throughout the years, the researcher selected 701 incidents of 
comprehensive data analyses.  
Crane accidents are costly, often disrupt scheduling, destroy equipment, and cause injuries 
and deaths. In this study, both monetary and human damages caused by these incidents were 
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quantified. While working with Crane Owners, Crane Users, and manufacturers, the researcher 
realized that a primary goal of all parties in the crane industry was to eliminate catastrophic events 
and to protect workers and the public. The implementation of standards, training requirements, 
and governing bodies was the consequential result of that basic goal.  
Cranes have served as a backbone in all industries that require lifting and moving loads of 
various sizes and shapes. When properly used by well trained personnel, the mechanical advantage 
provided by cranes improves greatly both productivity and safety. The research included in this 
study has evaluated crane accidents in all U.S. states except South Dakota (the researcher has not 
studied a crane accident and has not been involved with any projects in this state). Work in the 49 
other states has provided a broad cross section of information. Unlike prior studies regarding crane 
incidents, the data used within this study are not limited to incidents involving only crane related 
injuries and fatalities. Instead, the data of this study covers injuries, fatalities, equipment damage, 
and property damage. The data also list responsibilities, a unique addition to the general 
information. Based on requests from Subject Matter Experts (industry experts), the data analyses 
also are segregated into OSHA regions to facilitate comparative analyses.    
3.3 USE OF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS 
Crane accident information collected and analyzed by the researcher of this study, includes 
details regarding site characteristics, witness statements, crane characteristics/configurations, and 
measurements detailing the crane location and operating radius. For larger accident sites, the 
information collection process included high-definition 3D laser scanning processes which 
recorded detailed information regarding overall characteristics of the site, debris location, 
surrounding hazards, and details of the lift plan layout. Additional information regarding company 
personnel involved with the lift was collected and analyzed to determine whether they had carried 
out their assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with ASME B30.5-2007 standard.  The 
collection of such extensive information ensured that sufficient detail was available to permit 
preparation of detailed reports of findings. These detailed analyses have identified many factors 
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that may have contributed to causing accidents. With these additional factors identified, improved 
lift planning and safety analyses have evolved on the work sites.  
Based on the background and experience in both operations and forensic analysis, the 
researcher established five essential elements of information (primary attributes) are crucial to 
every crane accident investigation. Analysts should make every effort to collect this information 
at every crane accident site, thereby to assure that sufficient information is available to conduct a 
complete analysis. The five major attributes (essential elements of information) comprised the 
following: accident data, crane characteristics, personnel responsibilities, project characteristics, 
and operational background. 
Specific data collection efforts must accompany the primary elements of information. The 
researcher learned quickly that each accident first should be classified according to accident type.  
Types of accident information provides the starting point by identifying initiating and contributing 
factors of an accident. Random examinations of the preliminary data enabled the researcher to 












Table 4: Types of Accidents and Explanation of Accident Characteristics/Factors 
 
Accident Type Explanation of Accident 
 
Assembly/Disassembly Crew was conducting assembly or 
disassembly of a crane 
 
Boom/Jib Dropped The boom or jib lost support and fell 
 
Boom/Jib/Tower Collapse Boom, job, or tower collapsed during 
operation 
 
Crane De-Rail/Travel Crane is traveling or upset 
 
Crane Stability/Overturn Crane lost stability and overturned 
 
Landed Load-Stability Load is landed on unstable structure or 
bracing 
 
Lifting Personnel Basket Incident occurs during which the lifting 
personnel is in a basket 
 
Power Line Contact Some part of the crane or rigging contacts a 
power line 
 
Rigging Failure A component of the rigging failed 
 
Signaling Improper signals disrupt the lift 
 
Slewing Assembly Failure Slewing assembly separates and fails 
 




Load block or overhaul ball contacts boom tip 
sheave 
 
Unstable/Dropped/Lost Load A lifted load becomes unstable and drops 
from the rigging 
 





Prior to formulating final versions of the primary elements of information list and types of 
accident list, the researcher consulted with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) with knowledge in 
manufacturing, service industries, contracting, insurance, labor relations, government 
requirements, and consulting groups, to take advantage of their experience with crane related 
accidents. SMEs were selected from ASME Committees, the NCCCO Committees, Service 
Providers (Crane Rental Companies), and Contractors. SMEs provided a wealth of experience and 
background and were located throughout the United States and Canada. The researcher collected 
responses from the SMEs through direct meetings and correspondence. The researcher requested 
that participants provide their evaluation, comments and recommendations regarding the 
following: 
• Are the five primary attributes (essential elements of information) suggested in this study 
sufficient to evaluate conclusive causes of accidents? If not, please provide additional areas 
that should be addressed. 
• Based on the five primary attributes (essential elements of information), what specific 
secondary information should be collected? 
• Are there situations and conditions, in your industry, that are so unique that they should be 
included in this study? 
The researcher evaluated participant responses and identified pertinent areas of 
interest/exploration, which thereby enhanced crane accident causation analyses. Based upon the 
recommendations made by polled participants, the researcher included 57 specific items of 
information regarding the accident to be inputted into the analyses. In addition to these items, a 
narrative summary of site-specific issues that caused or contributed to the incident proved very 
useful. All information entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was compiled to make available 
combinations of information and thereby enable users to focus on key risk factors. Each response 
was documented (verbally or by e-mail) and evaluated. The final outline of primary attributes and 




Figure 3: Primary & Secondary Crane Study Attributes 
Primary and secondary attributes concerning Research Questions 1 and 2, provided general 
and specific information for the overall crane industry and for each independent industry sector.  
Each accident analysis includes identifications of the responsible parties, based on the ASME 
B30.5-2007 standard, Mobile and Locomotive Cranes. This standard identifies and lists specific 
duties of all parties involved in a crane lift. Even though the ASME B30.5 standard was published 
in 2007, these duties have been applied, to at least some extent to accident cause evaluations, as 
far back as early 1980s. The standard duties, as applied to the lifts, provide useful information 
describing the progression, changes, and trends within the crane industry as well as the effects of 
personnel training and certifications in reducing crane accidents.   
3.4 CRANE USE CATEGORIES 
The fact that cranes are used in many different industries made obvious the need to include 
crane use category (sector) as part of the study. Addressing crane accidents based on industry use 
was important. Initially, the study identified four basic categories: Commercial Construction, 
Residential Construction, Highway Road and Bridge, and Industrial and Manufacturing. As data 
collection continued, and at the suggestion of SMEs, the categories were expanded to 10 
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categories, which included Arborist/Logging, Agricultural Industry, Commercial Construction, 
Highway Road & Bridge, Industrial/Manufacturing, Marine Industry, Mining Industry, Oilfield- 
Land Base, Oilfield- Offshore, and Residential Construction. 
During the analysis process, it became clear that Manufacturing Industry issues were 
distinctly different from the Industrial Industry issues. The Industrial Industry was defined as an 
industry which constructed structures not intended for habitation, waste water treatment plants; 
power plants; chemical plants; and refineries. Ultimately, the researcher combined Industrial and 
Refining into one category, established Manufacturing as a single category, and combined 
Agricultural with a similar industry, Arborist/Logging. The final category list comprised the 
following: Arborist/Logging/Agriculture, Commercial Construction, Highway Road & Bridge, 
Industrial/Refinery, Marine Industry, Mining Industry, Manufacturing Industry, Oilfield- Land 
Base, Oilfield- Offshore, and Residential Construction.
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The ability to separate the database in accordance with usage and as related to 
industry categories, allowed specific data exploration related to individual industries. It 
also provided overall crane accident analysis information. The categories included date, 
location, crane type, conditions affecting the accident, causation and consequences of the 
accident, and responsible parties involved in the accident.  
Cataloging was based on forensic engineering reports published by highly 
qualified, licensed engineers, input from industry experts, photographs, research of 
consensus industry safety standards, and other available documents. Once cataloged into 
the database, accident information was analyzed statistically identifying potential risk 
patterns and trends. Results indicating crane accident patterns were explored to identify 
areas in which improved safety standardization and increased training/focus was needed. 
Crane lift accident trends can substantiate or disprove the training benefits and 
effectiveness of certifying entities involved in crane processes. The results of this study 
demonstrate the importance of careful lift planning and provide information by which to 
improve crane designs, develop and streamline industry safety standards, and enhance lift 
coordination. Lift coordination enhancements derive from examining roles and 
responsibilities, thereby mitigating crane accident risks.  
Issues peculiar to each industry were compared to overall study results to identify 
problematic issues unique to each particular sector. Since each industry employs different 
types of workers, there are differing procedural and training requirements associated with 
crane operations. Furthermore, site conditions and hazards vary dramatically between 
industries. Finally, industry standards and guidelines differ and are often different from 
those explained in the ASME B30.5 standards. For example, ASME B30.5 specifically 
forbids operators from lifting personnel by the hook; however, ANSI Z133.1-2006, the 
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Arboricultural Operation Safety Requirements standard, provides guidance for lifting 
personnel into trees while personnel are attached to the crane hook by a harness. The 
Arboricultural Industry has found that it is far safer to lift individuals into a tree using a 
crane, as opposed to individuals to climb the tree. The Oilfield Industry also has an 
independent standard developed by the American Petroleum Institute (API). Applications 
of national standards cross all category boundaries unless addressed specifically by a 
particular industry such as the Arborists or the Oilfield Industry. 
3.5 VALIDATION OF INPUT DATA 
To ensure consistent input quality control, specific informational items were 
identified which must be available and reviewed in order to qualify for inclusion in the 
study. In 2012, Ray King, a forensic engineer from the Houston office of Haag Engineering 
Company, completed graduate studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). 
During King’s studies, he published his thesis, a summary of 75 crane related accidents 
using information from the researcher’s study/data. King’s preliminary study aided in 
establishing information requirements for incident inclusion. King employed a portion of 
the researcher’s Microsoft Excel input sheets imported into Microsoft Access. The King 
study provided statistical values/tables for the various incident data parameters but did not 
include statistical comparisons. Further, the King (2012) study incorporated only five 
categories: Commercial Construction, Highway Road & Bridge, Industrial, Residential, 
and Marine. As determined by King (2012), it is crucial that information included in any 
data set be complete and be inputted consistently. All data, including that used by King 
(2012), was analyzed and inputted by this researcher to ensure consistent evaluation 
techniques. The MIT thesis represented a credible model for confirming consistent input 
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quality while demonstrating the need to perform more extensive examination of all 701 
crane accidents. 
Several accidents actually predated initiation of this study but assignments to 
analyze them were not received until at least 1987. Initial procedures involved in 
developing the detailed and comprehensive database for this study analysis included 
elimination of crane accidents for which too much required information was missing or 
indeterminate. To ensure credibility of the data analyzed, duplicate cases were removed. 
For example, several files included original forensic analyses and accident investigation 
reports in addition to OSHA citation assessments. The researcher also identified some 
duplications in the original dataset. After identification and further analysis of cases, the 
researcher determined that cranes were not involved and eliminated those cases from the 
database. For example, one case involved a claim that a crane traveling across a drill site 
caused the subgrade to liquefy. Actually, fracking by steam injection, was the sole cause 
of the soil liquefaction at the site. Reported crane accidents which did not involve the direct 
participation of a crane were not included.   
 Procedures developed from the preliminary study required that at least three 
sources of information from a base list be satisfied in order that the information qualify as 
a complete evaluation. Haag Engineering Co. could not be the sole source of information. 
Outside sources had to provide a third-party evaluation and perspective that might not have 
been addressed or might have been viewed differently by the researcher. Table 5, (below), 
provides details regarding sources of information used in the compilation of each study.  
All sources were evaluated after confirmation of the comprehensiveness of dataset details.  
 The researcher developed precise procedures to ensure consistent and valid 
information to be entered into the database. Obtaining information external to the 
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researcher’s accident investigation reinforced and supplemented information obtained, and 
conclusions developed by the researcher. 
Table 5: Sources of Study and Utilization 
3.6 ASME B30.5- 2007 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
One unique aspect of this study is inclusion of duties and responsibilities defined 
by the ASME B30.5-2007 standard. While there is a hierarchy associated with crane lifts, 
the official assignment of lift duties and responsibilities finally occurred during 2007, with 
publication of ASME B30.5. This document specified the roles of operators, Signal 
Persons, and person directing the lift (i.e., Lift Director). For years, the “failsafe” 
conclusion regarding accident causation was “operator error.” There was no consideration 
of other external factors that potentially could have altered results of an accident. ASCE 
Report No. 93 (Sale 1998) concluded that when parties are not provided with proper 
directions or necessary information regarding their roles and responsibilities, the potential 
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for an accident is greatly increased. The 1989 tower crane collapse in San Francisco, CA 
confirmed this conclusion.   
Research has determined that identification of duties and responsibilities originated 
with the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers 
(1952). The Rigging Manual for Ironworkers, Manual III, published in 1952, details crane 
selection, erection, rigging, load handling, signaling, and general lift practices. This 
manual outlined, specific duties for those involved in the crane lift (i.e., the Crane 
Operator, the Foreman/Lift Director, the Rigger/Ironworker, and the Signal Person). 
Similar, yet more advanced, training requirements are included in the 2009 version of the 
Ironworkers Quality Construction Practices entitled the Cranes: Reference Manual. In 
early/mid 1970’s, Donald E. Dickie, P. Eng., Assistant General Manager of Construction 
Safety Association of Ontario, organized the duties and responsibilities in more detail in 
presentations and in his three books, Crane Handbook, Mobile Crane Manual, and 
Rigging Manual. 
The ASCE’s Manuals and Reports on Engineering Practice (No. 93) was the first 
U.S. publication that specified requirements regarding the duties and responsibilities of 
U.S. Crane Operators.  ASCE adopted this publication titled Crane Safety on Construction 
Sites, on April 16, 1994. This publication was created following the San Francisco tower 
crane incident. In response to the collapse, the American Society of Civil Engineers 
appointed a Task Force to conduct a comprehensive review of crane safety on construction 
sites. This special publication addressed variations of usage and organization by clearly 
defining and assigning crane management responsibilities. For the first time in history, a 
graphic in the document clearly defined the duties of those involved in the lifting operation 















Figure 4: Zones of Responsibility 
One of the major problems identified during the San Francisco crane investigation 
was limited understanding among parties by workers at the site of their individual 
responsibilities. ASCE 93, a 104-page report, established guidelines and responsibilities 
for Crane Owners, Project Owners, Architect-Engineers, Service Providers, Crane 
Operators, Riggers, Lift Directors, Site Supervisors, Signal Personnel, Users, and PC/CMs 
(Prime Contractor/Construction Managers). Each party was assigned with a detailed 
description of their responsibilities. Further, the document included a table that addressed 
every aspect of the lift process from project initiation to the actual lift. 
During the early 2000s, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers’ B30.5-
Mobile and Locomotive Cranes subcommittee began collecting all available information 
regarding duties and responsibilities for those involved in crane projects. This list also 
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included an operations standard section. Since ASME B30 is an ANSI certified national 
consensus standard, the committee must maintain a balance between the interests of Crane 
Owners, manufacturers, labor, government, consultants, trainers, etc., to ensure that no 
one interest group controls the standard. In 2007, ASME issued the ASME B30.5 standard 
to become effective one-year later, in 2008. The initial duties list included roles and 
responsibilities for Operators, Signal Persons, and the person who directs the lift (Lift 
Director). Ultimately, the person directing the lift became designated as the Lift Director 
and the ASME B30.20, Below-the-Hook Lifting Devices, called out specific duties and 
responsibilities for Riggers. ASME cited the following rationale for developing the 
specific duties and responsibilities lists for crane lift personnel:  
Rationale: Since 1982 Section 5-3.1.3 has dealt with the conduct of operators only.  
The crane operator alone cannot ensure the safety of lifting operations. There are 
other parties who are an integral part of crane and lifting operations and who must 
also fulfill their responsibilities if safety is to be achieved. Section 5-3.1.3 has been 
modified to identify the key parties associated with crane and lifting operations and 
to delineate the corresponding responsibilities of which they must be aware (ASME 
B30.5 Ballot TR#:  02-2094, December 14, 2005, p.5). 
In the sections below, the duties and responsibilities, as issued by ASME B30.5-2007, are 
described. 
3.6.1 B30.5 Responsibilities 
While the organizational structure of various industries and project teams may 
differ, the following roles are described for the purpose of delineating responsibilities. All 
responsibilities listed below shall be assigned in the organization’s worksite. It is important 










Crane Operator Directly controls the crane’s functions. 
 
Crane Owner Possesses custodial control of the crane by virtue of lease or 
ownership. 
 
Crane User Arranges the crane’s presence on a worksite and controls the crane’s 
use on the site. 
 
Lift Director Directly oversees the work being performed by a crane and the 
associated rigging crew. 
 
Site Supervision Exercises supervisory control over the worksite on which a crane is 
being used and over the work which is being performed on that site. 
  
Rigger Attaches the load to be lifted to the crane hook using slings, 
shackles, spreader beams, safety hoist rings, etc., and other gear as 
appropriate 
3.6.1.1 Responsibilities of the Crane Operator 
The Crane Operator has many responsibilities, as noted below. Yet, there are some 
responsibilities that the Crane Operator does not have. For example, the Crane Operator 
shall not be responsible for hazards or conditions that are not under his/her direct control 
and that adversely affect the lift operations. Whenever the operator has doubt as to the 
safety of crane operations, the operator shall stop the crane’s functions in a controlled 
manner. Lift operations shall resume only after safety concerns have been addressed or the 
continuation of crane operations is directed by the Lift Director. According to B30.5, the 
Crane Operator’s responsibilities include: 
a) Understanding and applying the information contained in the crane 
manufacturer’s operating manual. 
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b) Understanding the crane’s functions and limitations, as well as its particular 
operating characteristics. 
c) Knowing what types of site conditions could adversely affect the operation of 
the crane and consulting with the Lift Director concerning the possible presence 
of these conditions. 
d) Ensuring that all controls are in the off or neutral position and that all personnel 
are in the clear before energizing the crane or starting the engine;  
e) Using the crane’s load/capacity chart(s) and diagrams and applying all notes 
and warnings related to the charts, to confirm the correct crane configurations to 
suit the load, site, and lift conditions. 
f) Knowing and following the procedures specified by the manufacturer or 
approved by a qualified person, for assembly, disassembly, setting up, and 
reeving the crane. 
g) Observing each outrigger during extension, setting and retraction or using a 
Signal Person to observe each outrigger during extension, setting or retraction. 
h) Performing a daily inspection as specified in 5-2.1.2(a)(c)(d) (h) and 5-
2.4.2(a)(1). 
i) Testing the crane function controls that will be used and operating the crane 
only if those function controls respond properly. 
j) Promptly reporting the need for any adjustments or repairs to a designated 
person. 
k) Following applicable Lock Out/Tag Out procedures. 
l) Considering all factors known that might affect the crane capacity and 
informing the Lift Director of the need to make appropriate adjustments. 
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m) Reviewing the requirements for the crane with the Lift Director before 
operations. 
n) Ensuring that the load and rigging weight(s) have been provided. 
o) Calculating or determining, the net capacity for all configurations which will be 
used and verifying, using the load/capacity chart(s), that the crane has sufficient 
net capacity for the proposed lift. 
p) Understanding basic load rigging procedures. For responsibility of rigging the 
load and ensuring that the load is rigged properly see Sections 5-3.1.3.2.2(h) 
and (i). 
q) Knowing the standard and special signals as specified in Section 5-3.3 and 
responding to such signals from the person who is directing the lift or an 
appointed Signal Person.  When a Signal Person is not required as part of the 
lift operation, the Operator is then responsible for the movement of the crane. 
However, the Operator shall obey a stop signal at all times, no matter who gives 
it. 
r) Operating the crane’s functions, under normal operating conditions, in a smooth 
and controlled manner. 
s) Not operating the crane when physically or mentally unfit. 
t) Not engaging in any practice that will divert his attention while actually 
operating the crane controls. 
u) Refusing to operate the crane when any portion of the load or crane would enter 
the “Prohibited Zone” of energized power lines except as defined in 5-3.4.5.4. 
v) Knowing how to travel the crane.  
w) If power fails during operations- 
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a. setting all brakes and locking devices; 
b. moving all clutches or other power controls to the off or neutral 
position; 
c. landing any load suspended below the hook under brake control if 
practical;  
d. before leaving the crane unattended;  
e. landing any load suspended below the hook, unless the requirements of 
5-3.2.1.4(d) are met; 
f. disengaging the master clutch; 
g. setting travel, swing, boom brakes, and other locking devices; 
h. putting controls in the off or neutral position; 
i. stopping the engine:  An exception to this may exist when crane 
operation is frequently interrupted during a shift and the operator must 
leave the crane.  Under these circumstances, the engine may remain 
running and paras, (1) through (4) above shall apply. The operator shall 
be situated where any entry to the crane can be observed. 
x) Considering the recommendations of the manufacturer for securing the crane, 
when a local weather storm warning exists. 
3.6.1.2 Responsibilities of the Crane Owner and the Crane User 
In some situations, the Crane Owner and the Crane User may be the same entity 
and is therefore accountable for all of the responsibilities listed below.  In other cases, the 
Crane User may lease or rent a crane from the Crane Owner without supervisory, 
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operational, maintenance, support personnel, or services from the Crane Owner.  In these 
situations, the following shall apply. 
The Crane Owner’s Responsibilities 
a) Providing a crane that meets the requirements of Chapters 5-1 and 5-2 of this 
volume, as well as specific job requirements defined by the user.  
b) Providing a crane and all necessary components, specified by the manufacturer, 
that meets the Crane User’s requested configuration and capacity.  
c) Providing additional technical information pertaining to the crane, necessary for 
crane operation, when requested by the Crane User.  
d) Providing all applicable load/capacity chart(s) and diagrams. 
e) Providing field assembly, disassembly, operation, and maintenance information, 
warning decals and placards installed as prescribed by the crane manufacturer. 
f) Establishing an inspection, testing, and maintenance program in accordance 
with Chapter 5-2 and inform the Crane User of the requirements of this 
program. 
g) Using personnel that meet the requirements for a designated person as defined 
in para. 5-0.2.2 for the purposes of maintenance, repair, transport, assembly and 
disassembly. 
h) Using personnel that meet the requirements for a qualified or designated person 
as defined in para. 5-0.2.2, for inspections as required in Section 5-2.1. 
The Crane User’s Responsibilities 
a) Complying with the requirements of this volume, manufacturer’s requirements 
and those regulations applicable at the worksite.  
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b) Ensuring that the crane is in proper operating condition prior to initial use at the 
worksite by: 
a) verifying that the Crane Owner has provided documentation that the crane 
meets the requirements of Section 5-2.1.5 of this volume. 
b) verifying that a “Frequent Inspection” has been performed as defined in 5-
2.1.2. 
c) Verifying that the crane has the necessary lifting capacity to perform the 
proposed lifting operations in the planned configuration. 
d) Using supervisors for crane activities that meet the requirements for a qualified 
person as defined in para. 5-0.2.2.  
e) Using Crane Operators that meet the requirements of 5-3.1.1 and 5-3.1.2 (f). 
Additional qualifications may be necessary to perform the tasks that will be 
required with the crane which they are assigned to operate. 
f) Ensuring the assigned operator(s) has been notified of adjustments or repairs 
that have not yet been completed, prior to commencing crane operations.  
g) Using personnel that meet the requirements for a qualified or designated person 
as defined in para. 5-0.2.2, for inspections as required in Section 5-2.1.  
h) Using personnel that meet the requirements for a designated person as defined 
in para. 5-0.2.2 for the purposes of maintenance, repair, transport, assembly and 
disassembly.  
i) Ensuring that all personnel involved in maintenance, repair, transport, 
assembly, disassembly and inspection are aware of their responsibilities, 
assigned duties, and associated hazards.   
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j) Ensuring that the inspection, testing, and maintenance programs specified by 
the Crane Owner are followed. 
3.6.1.3 Responsibilities of the Site Supervisor and the Lift Director 
In some situations, the Site Supervisor and the Lift Director may be the same 
person. 
The Site Supervisor’s Responsibilities 
a) Ensuring that the crane meets the requirements of Chapter 5-2 prior to initial 
site usage.  
b) Ensuring that a qualified person is designated as the Lift Director. 
c) Determining if additional regulations are applicable to crane operations.   
d) Ensuring that Crane Operators meet the requirements of para. 5-3.1.2. 
e) Ensuring that the area for the crane is adequately prepared. The preparation 
includes but is not limited to the following: 
a) access roads for the crane and associated equipment;  
b) sufficient room to assemble and disassemble the crane; 
c) an operating area that is suitable for the crane with respect to levelness, 
surface conditions, support capability, proximity to power lines, 
excavations, slopes, underground utilities, subsurface construction and 
obstructions to crane operation.   
d) traffic control as necessary to restrict unauthorized access to the crane's 
working area;   
f) Ensuring that work involving the assembly and disassembly of a crane is 
supervised by a qualified person. 
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g) Allowing crane operation near electric power lines only when the 
requirements of para. 5-3.4.5. have been met. 
h) Ensuring that conditions which may adversely affect crane operations are 
addressed.  Such conditions include but are not limited to: 
a) Poor soil conditions 
b) Wind velocity or gusting winds 
c) Heavy rain 
d) Fog 
e) Extreme cold 
f) Artificial lighting 
i) Ensuring that work performed by the rigging crew is supervised by a qualified 
person. 
j) Ensuring that crane operations are coordinated with other job site activities 
that will be affected by or will affect lift operations; 
k) Permitting special lifting operations only when equipment and procedures 
required by this volume, the crane manufacturer, or a qualified person are 
employed.  Such operations include but are not limited to: 
a) multiple crane lifts; 
b) lifting personnel; 
c) pick and carry operations. 
l) Ensuring that crane maintenance is performed by a designated person. 
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Responsibilities of the Lift Director 
In some situations, the Crane Owner and the Crane User may be the same entity and 
is therefore accountable for all of the responsibilities listed below.  In other cases, the Crane 
User may lease or rent a crane from the Crane Owner without supervisory, operational, 
maintenance, support personnel, or services from the Crane Owner.  In these situations, the 
following shall apply. 
The Lift Director’s Responsibilities 
a) Being present at the jobsite during lifting operations. 
b) Ensuring that the preparation of the area needed to support crane operations 
has been completed before crane operations commence. 
c) Ensuring necessary traffic controls are in place to restrict unauthorized access 
to the crane’s work area. 
d) Ensuring that personnel involved in crane operations understand their 
responsibilities, assigned duties and the associated hazards. 
e) Appointing the Signal Person(s) and conveying that information to the crane 
operator. 
f) Ensuring that Signal Person(s) appointed meet the requirements of Section 5-
3.3. 
g) Informing the crane operator of the weight of loads to be lifted, as well as the 
lifting, moving and placing locations for these loads and obtain the operator’s 
verification that this weight does not exceed the crane's rated capacity. 
h) Ensuring that a crane’s load rigging is performed by designated personnel as 
defined in para. 5-0.2.2. 
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i) Ensuring that the load is properly rigged and balanced before it is lifted more 
than a few inches. 
j) Ensuring precautions are implemented when hazards associated with special 
lifting operations are present.  Such operations include but are not limited to: 
a) multiple crane lifts; 
b) lifting personnel; 
c) pick and carry operations; 
d) mobile cranes operating on barges. 
k) Allowing crane operation near electric power lines only when the 
requirements of para. 5-3.4.5 and any additional requirements determined by 
the Site Supervisor have been met. 
l) Stopping crane operations if alerted to an unsafe condition affecting those 
operations. 
m) Addressing safety concerns raised by the operator or other personnel and 
being responsible if he decides to overrule those concerns and directs crane 
operations to continue. In all cases, the manufacturer’s criteria for safe 
operation and the requirements of this volume shall be adhered to.  
n) Ensuring that the applicable requirements of ASME B30.23 are met when 
lifting personnel. 
3.6.1.4 Responsibilities of the Rigger 
In some situations, the Crane Operator and the Rigger may be the same entity and is 
therefore accountable for all of the responsibilities listed below.  
The Rigger’s Responsibilities (ASME B22-3.1.3.3.2) 
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The Rigger’s responsibilities shall include the following:  
a) Determine or know the weight and estimate the center of gravity of the load to 
be lifted. 
b) Select and inspect rigging gear such as slings, shackles, safety hoist rings, 
lifting beams, etc., before use. 
c) Ensure that the working load limit of the rigging gear selected is sufficient for 
the load to be lifted. 
d) Properly attach and secure the load to the crane hook using the appropriately 
selected rigging gear. 
e) Ensure sufficient protection for load, slings, and other rigging equipment that 
could be cut or damaged during load handling activities 
f) Ensure that the load is properly rigged and balanced before it is lifted more 
than a few inches (several centimeters). 
g) Know and provide correct signals to the crane operator. 
The cranes-Derrick Advisory Committee (C-DAC) was assembled early 2000s to 
update the prior OSHA 1926.550 standard.  During November 2010, OSHA 1926.1400 
was issued following public review during the summer of 2010.  OSHA 1926.1400 
includes reference to the B30 standard requirements. 
3.7 CRANE LIFT DEVELOPMENT  
The ASME rationale for prescribing duties and responsibilities, “The crane operator 
alone cannot ensure the safety of lifting operations. There are other parties who are an integral 
part of crane and lifting operations and who must also fulfill their responsibilities if safety is 
to be achieved” (ASME B30.5 Ballot TR#:  02-2094, December 14, 2005, p.5). To 
understand all duties of responsible parties, the researcher has developed a theoretical lift 
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plan to identify parties involved with preparing a lift plan. Utilizing literature searches, past 
experience with planning lifts, and the ASME responsibilities list, the researcher identified 
all parties who provide input or have specific duties in lift plan development.   
The ASME’s P30.1-2014 standard, Planning for Load Handling Activities, 
continues to be the most current guide for lift planning. This ASME P30.1 standard has 
established that the “lift planner” is essential on every construction project and with overall 
lift process. An individual designation of lift planner was not called out in the original plan 
assembly since multiple participants of the lift project could perform that function. There 
were multiple occurrences where secondarily responsible personnel were required to check 
or ensure that particular tasks were complete and correct.  
With the exception of the crane and load manufacturers, every primary party task 
was assigned, and a secondary, redundant party task was assigned to ensure lift safety and 
proper safety checks and balances. The initial purpose of the examination was to identify 
all parties involved in planning lifts and to demonstrate what input each provided. Table 7, 
below, overviews the responsible parties and provides details regarding designated primary 
(P) and secondary (s) responsibilities of the listed parties. 
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The purpose of this lift development guideline is to provide list of the entities 
required to organize and produce a lift plan. A complete understanding of all responsible 
parties has been lacking in prior studies. The theoretical lift plan development clearly 
depicts those parties that have input into the plan which go beyond personnel that conduct 
the lift. The number of primary and secondary responsibilities have been summed, and a 
percent accountability factor of each party, established. Initially, both primary and 
secondary tasks were assigned equal values of one; however, to better reflect the level of 
responsibility, primary was assigned a value of two. 
Table 8: Primary/Secondary Responsibilities (Weighted) 
 
 
The four most responsible parties remain the same for both regular and weighted 
averages: Lift Director (23.1%), Operator (18.9%), Site Supervisor (18.2%) and Rigger 
(16.8%).  The Site Supervisor and Rigger do exchange positions in the weighted analysis. 
Examination of a theoretical lift plan clearly demonstrates that multiple parties must be 
involved in the lift development process and critical to the ultimate outcome of the crane 
lift. Each individual responsible for performing specific tasks has a direct bearing in 
assuring safe success of a lift.  The size of the project and weight of the load being lifting 
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will result in some personnel being assign multiple roles. ASME B30 references the 
possibility that the Site Supervisor and Lift Director may be, in some instances, the same 
person. Therefore, under those conditions, the Site Supervisor/Lift Director is responsible 
for 41.3% of the critical input items for a lift. Incorrect information and failure to perform 
required tasks, both human intervention factors, are primary contributing factors for crane 
accidents. 
The National Commission for the Certification of Crane Operators (NCCCO) 
developed a program for the Lift Director, which was implemented in late 2016 with the 
first Lift Director certification issued in first quarter of 2017. The Lift Director certification 
requires testing in the following areas of competency: 
• Site control and evaluation  
• Roles, responsibilities of parties, and required qualifications of lift personnel 
• Lifting operations 
• Lift Plans 
• Rigging 
• Signaling 
• Read and understand load charts 
• Hydraulic and Lattice Boom 
In accordance with the NCCCO requirements, the Lift Director must be proficient 
in crane operations and understand the requirements of a Crane Operator (i.e., hazard, load 
charts, operation, etc.), Rigger (i.e., application of the rigging and proper selection), 
signaling (i.e., proper signals and dynamics of cranes), site (i.e., site conditions, preparation 
and existing hazards of the site), roles (i.e., understand and explain the responsibilities of 
the crew members to perform a lift), lifting operations (i.e., swing path, obstructions, load 
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stability, selection of Riggers, Signal Person, and placement of field personnel), and the 
lift plans (i.e., develop lift plans and direct the operation). The Lift Director’s role is 
paramount to safe lifting procedures and requires proper direction and control of the 
operation and field personnel. The theoretical lift plan provides an understanding of the 
roles of all parties of a lift and demonstrates that the operator is responsible for movement 
and control of the load from the lifting point to the final placement in accordance with 
ASME. More specifically, ASME requires that the Crane Operators not divert his/her 
attention from this role, thus requiring all parties perform their assigned tasks properly and 
safely. The Lift Director’s role is to ensure collaboration between all parties by maintaining 
continuous communications of the lift crew which is critical immediately prior to the lifting 
process.  
3.8 ASME P30.1-5-3 PRE-LIFT MEETING   
ASME P30.1 provided a Pre-Lift Meeting list of items that should be address before 
lifting. The Lift Director should hold a pre-lift meeting to discuss the plan and the roles of 
the personnel involved in the lift.  Pre-Lift Meeting list requirements include the following 
components- 
a) At a minimum, the following elements should be reviewed with all load handling 
activity personnel: 
a) Overview of the load handling activity; 
b) LHE (Load Handling Equipment), rigging, and other equipment involved 
in the load handling activity; 
c) The sequence of events and step-by-step procedures for the entire load 
handling activity; 
d) Safety measures, as required (e.g., Job Safety Analysis action items); 
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e) Load handling activity personnel assignments, addressing: 
i. individual responsibilities (e.g., location, task, time) 
ii. work location hazards (e.g., pinch points) 
iii. communication methods 
iv. personal protective equipment requirements 
v. qualification(s) of assigned personnel (certification) 
f) Any contingency measures as determined in para. 5-2.9. 
g) Any emergency action plan as determined in para. 5-2.10. 
b) Concerns raised during this meeting shall be addressed prior to proceeding with the 
load handling activity. 
c) At the completion of the pre-lift meeting, the Lift Director should confirm that the 
attendees understand the plan and their roles and responsibilities during the load 
handling activity. 
d) For repetitive lifts, the Lift Director should decide the frequency of pre-lift 
meetings. Pre-lift meetings may not be required prior to each repetition of the load 
handling activity. 
The P30.1 pre-lift meeting guidelines are recommendations (“should”) and are 
appropriate for all types of lifts (i.e., Critical, General, and Production). This format is 
recommended for all lifts, since it bridges the gap between what the crew believes the lift 
entails and what the lift actually entails. Based on the evaluation of over 701 crane 
accidents, the lack of a pre-lift meeting would have addressed initiating or contributing 
factors of the incident, had such a meeting been performed. Study revealed that a pre-lift 
meeting did not occurred in over 62% (n = 440) of the 701 accidents analyzed. 
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3.9 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the procedures employed, validated data, and discussed 
aspects of crane lift development. Understanding the detailed elements of crane lifts is 
paramount in effectively analyzing the causes of crane accidents. An understanding of 
accident causation can ensure that safety procedures are upheld and that parties are carrying 
out their assigned duties and responsibilities. The Crane Operator is one of many parties 
that provides input and conducts their responsibilities in a manner that has found to be 
effective and safe. Collaboration and communication among all parties are the overriding 
parameters for the successful and safe completion of a lift. Workers must be aware of their 
responsibilities before a lift begins. Furthermore, certified training experts must educate all 
parties involved in the lift regarding their duties. When these parties carry out all of their 
assigned duties and responsibilities, effectiveness of the overall team, that is all crew 





Chapter 4- Findings from the Data Analyses and Trends 
 This chapter presents the makeup and construction of the study database, 
completeness of the input data evaluation, discussion of the estimated population, rationale 
of data analysis and description of statistical analysis applied.  An analysis was performed 
to address an estimated number of crane accident that occurred during the term of the study.  
Fatality data obtained from OSHA between 1992 and 2016 was compared to the number 
of fatalities during that same period. A factor between the fatal and non-fatal accidents was 
applied to the annual OSHA death rate for a 35-year period to estimate the total population 
of crane accidents. 
4.1 DATABASE CONSTRUCTION  
The original database was in Microsoft Excel and contained 108 variables involved 
in 701 crane accidents from 1983 to 2017 crane accidents. The criterion inclusion as 
completed analysis of each accident was a three-fold process. First, by expert consensus, it 
was agreed that a minimum number of sources for all cases that “qualified” to be input into 
the databases needed to be operationalized. At least one outside source of information not 
prepared by the research was required to be included in the study. Further, an actual video 
of the accident, of which there were many, could supplement for an outside source. At least 
three of the following were the primary sources of information relied upon for each 
evaluation:  
• Haag Engineering reports 
• Engineering reports from other sources 
• Documents concerning the lift 
• Incident scene inspections 
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• Photographs provided by others at the scene, taken immediately following the 
incident 
• OSHA report/file 
• Incident report by others 
• Depositions and witness statements 
• Testing, modeling, or video of the incident 
The aforementioned components became the criteria for a crane accident to be 
included in the study database based on meeting specific number and type of sources used. 
The researcher then separated out those incidents where an injury or death occurred; 
however, there was no physical damage to the crane or load. For example, the load dropped 
on a worker, the load pinched a worker (against a wall), the crane struck a worker, the load 
was being lifted inside a building (blind lift) and struck a worker, etc. These events would 
demonstrate that even a well-planned lift can result in an injury or death due to worker 
inattention or lack of supervision. 
4.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
There are two types of statistics that will be used in this data analysis.  First, 
descriptive statistics will be used to take large amounts of data and reduce them into more 
understandable units. Descriptive statistics used together with simple graphical analysis, 
essentially based on every quantitative analysis (Sheskin 2011). The variables in the crane 
accident data set are either nominal or ordinal. Nominal variables have groups that have no 
ranking such as gender (female and male), while ordinal groups have an inherent ranking 
or a given ranking like strength (i.e., weak, moderate, strong). The descriptive statistics 
used to present nominal and ordinal variables are frequency and percent. These are 
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arranged in a table known as a frequency distribution (Sheskin 2011). Descriptive statistics 
will be used largely in the Observations section. 
4.3 DATA CLEANING 
 The data was uploaded from Microsoft Excel to SPSS, version 24.0.  The process 
of data cleaning is about detecting and correcting (or removing) inaccurate records from a 
table or database and refers to identifying incomplete, incorrect, inaccurate or irrelevant 
parts of the data and then replacing, modifying, or deleting the affected data (Xu, Ihab, 
Sanjay, and Jianna 2016).  
4.3.1 Coding Errors 
 The process of changing to SPSS involved creating a list of all variables, variable 
type, column width, decimal places, variable labels and variable codes in SPSS. It was very 
important to decide which variables were crucial to the analysis and must have values for 
the responses to be complete. Next, looking for coding errors, such as, in the case of gender 
will have in most cases the possible codes of 1 = male, 2 = female, 0 = missing, and so, in 
this case, a code of 22 would be an error, other errors might include missing data values. 
This was checked and corrected using frequency tests (Xu, Ihab, Sanjay, and Jianna 2016). 
4.3.2 Outliers 
 The issue of statistically significant outliers can adversely impact data, especially 
if the sample is small. Moreover, outliers can hide or create statistical significance and are 
important to identify. This can be done by creating a bar graph or boxplot, or similar is one 
way to quickly identify outliers. Further, check for logical consistency of answers and use 
cross-tabulating pairs of variables is to find inconsistencies. This was done, and no 
significant inconsistencies were found (Xu, Ihab, Sanjay, and Jianna 2016). 
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4.3.3 Missing or Incomplete Data 
The guidelines for missing and incomplete data start with deciding how to deal with 
incorrect or missing values. Suggested methods are removing responses with missing or 
incorrect values, correct missing or incorrect data if the correct value is known, going back 
to the data source and filling in the missing data variables, setting values to an average or 
other statistical value, and coding as missing with a number like -999 (Xu, Ihab, Sanjay, 
and Jianna 2016). 
4.4 POPULATION SAMPLE OF CRANE ACCIDENTS 
 There are approximately 46,850 mobile cranes in the US and 2,500 tower cranes 
as of 2016. From 1992 to 2016, OSHA reports there have been 868 total crane fatalities 
in the U.S. There was a total of 701 crane accident investigations and 175 deaths from 







Figure 5: Fatalities Comparison- OSHA Fatalities, Study Incidents, and Study Fatalities 
(1992-2016) 
Data received from OSHA Directorate of Construction indicated that records were 
not specifically collected on crane-related fatalities until 1992. According to information 
provided fatalities associated with crane accidents between 1992 and 2016 totaled 868 
fatalities.  During the same period the study documented 159 fatalities. Average annual 
fatality rates were 6.36 for the study and 34.72 per OSHA which were approximately 5.46 
times more fatalities per year. Of the 701 study accidents, 557 occurred without a fatality 
while 144 resulted in at least one fatality or 3.8 (557/144) times more non-fatal accidents 
as fatal, and a factor of 4.8 (701/144) total accidents to fatal. Applying a factor of 4.8 to 
the annual OSHA fatality rate of 34.72 we arrive at approximately 167 total accidents per 
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year. Over a 35-year period of the study would equate to a total estimated population of 
accidents of 5,833 during the study period. A sample size of 701 accidents with a 
population of 5,833 would yield a confidence level of 99% with a 4.55% margin of error. 
If we apply a 20% factor for unreported non-fatal accidents to the estimated total would 
yield an estimated population of 7,000 accidents.  A sample size of 701 would equate to a 
99% confidence level with a 4.6% margin of error. 
As seen in Table 9, specifically in the Crane Capacity section, an interesting trend 
occurs with 15-99 tons being involved in 380 (49.1%) crane accidents followed by 100-
199 tons (n = 133, 17.2%) and 200-299 tons (n = 100, 12.9%) where the lowest numbers 
of accidents occur with the highest tonnage. Thirty (3.9%) accidents at 300-599 tons and 8 
(1.0%) at greater than 600 tons. Next, on First Crane Type, Mobile Hydraulic (n = 222, 
28.7%) and Track-Lattice (n = 124, 16.0%) accounted for 346 (44.7%) of all crane 
accidents. On the other hand, 22 other First Crane Types account for 54.3% of all crane 
accidents (Figure 6). For Second Crane Type, the same pattern emerged with Mobile 
Hydraulic and Track-Lattice being involved in the most accidents and three other types 











Table 9: Crane Characteristics 
 
CHARACTERISTIC FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Crane Capacity (tons)   
Less than 2 8 1.0 
2 to 14 41 5.3 
15 to 99 380 49.1 
100 to 199 133 17.2 
200 to 299 100 12.9 
300 to 599 30 3.9 
Greater than 600 8 1.0 
 
First Crane Type   
Boom Truck 49 6.3 
Derrick 1 .1 
Gantry 7 .9 
Jib Crane 1 .1 
Knuckle Boom 4 .5 
Mega Crane 5 .6 
Mobile Hydraulic 222 28.7 
Mobile Lattice 60 7.8 
Mobile RT 67 8.7 
Other 6 .8 
Overhead 44 5.7 
Shop Built 2 .3 
Special- Gin Pole 6 .8 
Special- Launching Girder 1 .1 
Special- Log Boom 1 .1 
Special- Marine 10 1.3 
Special- Side Boom 1 .1 
Special- Straddle Crane 2 .3 
Tower- Hammer Head 40 5.2 
Tower- Luffing 9 1.2 
Tower- Pedestal 21 2.7 
Tower- Self-Erect 8 1.0 
Track- Hydraulic 10 1.3 













Second Crane Type 
Table 9. cont. 
Mobile Hydraulic 9 1.2 
Mobile Lattice 3 .4 
Overhead 1 .1 
Tower- Pedestal 1 .1 








4.5 DATA ANALYSIS AND RATIONALE 
The second type of statistic is called inferential analysis (Sheskin 2011). The 
inferential analysis is when one trying to make conclusions beyond the immediate data or 
generalize to a specific population. The questions become, can the results found, from the 
sample, be generalized back to the population from which they were drawn (Sheskin 2011).   
There are two types of inferential statistics that are known as parametric and non-
parametric statistics. Two basic distinctions for parametric versus non-parametric is the 
level of measurement for the dependent variable (i.e., interval, ratio, nominal, and ordinal).  
For example, when the dependent variable is nominal or ordinal then one uses non-
parametric statistics, or if the data is in interval or ratio level dependent variables, then one 
uses scales you use parametric statistics (Sheskin 2011). Table 10 examines the differences 




Table 10: Parametric versus Nonparametric Differences 
 
   
 
CONDITION PARAMETRIC NONPARAMETRIC 
Assumed distribution Normal Any distribution 
 
Assumed variance Homogeneous Any distribution 
 
Typical data Ratio or interval Ordinal or nominal 
 
Data set relationships Independent Any 
 
Usual central measure Mean Median 
 
Benefits affected by tests Drawing more conclusions Simplicity and fewer outliers 
Correlation test Pearson Spearman 
 
Independent measures 2 groups (independent groups 
t-tests) 
Mann-Whitney test 




Repeated measures 2 conditions (matched pair t-
tests) 
Wilcoxon test 
Repeated measures > 2 conditions (one-way 
repeated) 
Friedman’s test 
Regression Multiple regression Multinomial logistic regression 
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Non-parametric means not of a source population. A non-parametric test is in this 
strict sense, is essentially a null category, since virtually all statistical tests assume one 
thing or another about the properties of the source population(s), the non-parametric does 
not (Sheskin 2011). Non-parametric measures of central tendency are typically the median 
and mode.   
A multinomial logistic regression is non-parametric multiple regression analysis 
used when the dependent variable is nominal and has more than two levels. Since the SPSS 
output of the analysis is somewhat different to the logistic regression’s output, multinomial 
regression is sometimes used instead (Menard 2010). Like all linear regressions, the 
multinomial regression is predictive analysis.   
As seen in Table 10, for Research Question 1, a non-parametric multinomial 
logistic regression was used since the independent variables are all nominal and the 
dependent variable is a multi-level nominal variable (Menard 2010). Each of the 11 
responsibility independent variables was dummy coded (1 = job responsibility and 0 = all 
other responsibilities). This coding was done in crane accidents involving one person 
primary, two people primary, three people primary, one-person secondary responsibility 
and two people secondary responsibility (Menard 2010). Multinomial regression has six 
assumptions to examine before running the statistic. These assumptions must be met to 
make sure the appropriate statistic has been chosen. 
4.5.1 Assumption 1 
The dependent variable should be measured at the nominal level. Examples of 
nominal variables include variables with 3, 4, and 5 categories or more. In this case, the 
dependent variable of Accident 1 has twenty nominal categories, Accident 2 has eighteen 
76 
 
nominal categories, and Accident 3 has 3 nominal categories (see Table 11). Assumption 
1 is met. 
4.5.2 Assumption 2 
There must be one or more independent variables that are continuous, ordinal, or 
nominal. There are eleven nominal categories in one group of independent variables, but 
there are a total forty-one nominal independent variables. Assumption 2 is therefore met.  
4.5.3 Assumption 3 
There should be the independence of observations (no one participant is in more 
than one group), and the dependent variable should have mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
categories. The three dependent variables of Accident 1, Accident 2, and Accident 3 have 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories, so this assumption is met.   
4.5.4 Assumption 4 
There should be no multicollinearity. Multicollinearity happens when two or more 
independent variables are highly correlated with each other, usually above .80 (Menard 
2010). This high correlation causes a problem in regard to understanding what variable 
contributes to the explanation of the dependent variable and technical issues in calculating 
a multinomial logistic regression (Menard 2010). A correlation matrix was run, and there 
was no multicollinearity. 
4.5.5 Assumption 5 
A linear relationship between any continuous independent variables and the logit 
transformation of the dependent variable. This could not be done since all the variables are 
dummy coded and considered nominal. 
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4.5.6 Assumption 6 
There should be no outliers, high leverage values, nor highly influential points. 
There were no statistically significant outliers, high leverage values, nor highly influential 
points. This assumption was met.  
Multinomial logistic regression was used to explain data and the relationship 
between one nominal dependent variable and one or more continuous-level (interval or 
ratio scale) independent variables (Menard 2010).  This statistic was done to examine 
Research Question 1 which stated, “Do the duties and responsibilities established by 
ASME B30.5 appropriately address associated causes of crane accidents by all responsible 
parties?” Also, to determine if the null hypothesis (below) was to be retained. 
H01. The duties and responsibilities established by ASME B30.5 do not address 
appropriately associated causes of crane accidents by all responsible parties. 
HA1. The duties and responsibilities established by ASME B30.5 do address 




Figure 7: Responsibility Flow Chart 
This flowchart, based on ASCE diagram, indicates the path of responsibility in a 




Table 11: Responsible Parties (Independent Variables) 
 
RESPONSIBILITY LEVEL FREQUENCY PERCENT 
 
1 Primary Responsibility   
Service Provider 49 6.4 
Crane Operator 167 21.6 
Lift Director 133 17.2 






Other 20 2.6 
Owner/User 26 3.4 
Rigger 118 15.3 
Signal Person 37 4.8 
Site Supervisor 103 13.3 
 
2 Primary Responsibility   
Service Provider 4 .5 
Crane Operator 31 4.0 
Lift Director 36 3.4 






Other 4 .5 
Owner/User 4 .5 
Rigger 40 5.2 
Signal Person 2 .3 
Site Supervisor 9 1.2 
 
3 Primary Responsibility   
Not Assigned 700 99.9 











1 Secondary Responsibility 
Table 11, cont.  
Value Not Assigned 610 88.2 
Crane Operator 23 3.0 
Lift Director 24 3.1 






Other 2 .3 
Owner/User 1 .1 
Rigger 23 3.0 
Service Provider 2 .3 
Signal Person 5 .6 
Site Supervisor 9 1.2 
 
2 Secondary Responsibility   
Not Assigned 699 99.7 
Rigger 1 .1 






Table 12: Accident Information- Dependent Variable (n = 701) 
 
QUESTION FREQUENCY PERCENT 
 
1 Person Accident Type 
 
  
Assembly/Disassembly 22 3.1 
 
Boom/Jib Collapsed 105 15.0 
 
Boom/Jib Dropped 45 6.4 
 
Crane Overturn 129 18.4 
 
Crane Travel/Derailed 12 1.7 
 
Land Load-Stability Failure 44 6.3 
 
Other 12 1.7 
 
Personnel Basket Failure 6 .9 
 
Power Line Contact 26 3.7 
 
Rigging Failure 33 4.7 
 
Signaling  17 2.4 
 
Slewing Assembly Failure 4 .6 
 
Trip/Slip/Fall/Jump From 10 1.4 
 
Two Block 11 1.6 
 
Unstable/Dropped/Lost Load 111 15.8 
 
Worker Contacted by Crane Accident 8 1.1 
 
 



























Worker Contracted by Load Accident 12 1.7 
 
 





2 Person Accident Type  
(Missing n = 407) 
 
  
Boom/Jib Collapsed 2 .7 
 
Boom/Jib Dropped 3 1.0 
 
Crane Overturn 2 .7 
 
Crane Travel/Derailed 1 .3 
 
Land Load-Stability Failure 2 .7 
 
Other 1 .3 
 
Personnel Basket Failure 1 .3 
 
Signaling  3 1.0 
 
Slewing Assembly Failure 1 .3 
 
Trip/Slip/Fall/Jump From 3 1.0 
 
Two Block 2 .7 
 
Unstable/Dropped/Lost Load 14 4.8 
 
Worker Contacted by Crane Accident 94 32.2 
 
 
Worker Contracted by Load Accident 124 42.5 
 
 





















3 Person Accident Type  

















Multinomial regression was run using the dependent variable of 1-Person Accident 
and 1-Person Primary Responsibility, and the result was the Nagelkerke R2 was equal to 
.743 and was significant at X 2 (190) = 947.692, p < 0.0001 (Table 13). This means that at 
74.3% of one-person accidents were explained by one-person responsibilities.  The null 
hypothesis is rejected, and the duties and responsibilities established by ASME B30.5 do 
address appropriately associated causes of crane accidents by all responsible parties. 
Table 13: Pseudo R- Square 
 








As seen in Table 14, an Odds Risk Ratio of 1.0 means a person had the same chance 
for exposure to the variable, while under 1.0 means there was a buffer protecting them. 
An Odd Risk Ratio (ORR) of 2.0 or 3.0 means the person has a 200% or 300% more of a 
chance being exposed to that variable (Sheskin 2011). As far Odds Risk Ratios go, most 
of the time the Service Provider, dramatically increased the odds of an accident. 
Table 15 shows the accident type and the responsible party from 1-Person 
Accidents. Starting with an accident on assembly/disassembly, the presence of a Service 
Provider (SP) causes the Odds Risk Ratio (OR) to rise from 1.0 to 6485.089 times the 
probability of an accident occurring. For the SP, the range of accidental probability range 
goes, for an accident to occur goes from 2.978 (Worker Contacted by Load No Accident) 
to 1,186,610,348,000,000,000.000 (Unstable/Dropped/Lost Load). The rest of the 
responsibilities increase accidents somewhere between 2.0 to 16.0). The data from 2 and 




Table 14: Accidents and Responsibilities- An Odds Risk Ratio Analysis 
 








(95% CONFIDENT INTERVAL) 
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Table 14, cont. 
 



















Slewing Assembly Failure  
















































Trip/Slip/Fall/Jump From  





































































Worker Contracted by Crane  

























Worker Contracted by Crane  














Large odds ratios are far more inaccurate than relative risk ratios, as it is always 
further away from 1.0 then relative risk (Andrade 2015). So, the suggestion is to use relative 
risk when odds ratios are very large (Andrade 2015), such as Assembly/Disassembly where 
the ORR fell from 6485.089 to the RR of 73.0 (Tables 14 and 15). The 1-Person Accident 
types were the largest in Table 14 and were converted to RR and one can clearly see the 
drop-in estimation. Relative risk ratios should be used in Table 15 since they are more 
accurate. In Table 15, the highest risk situation was Crane Overturn involving the fault or 
cause of the Service Provider at 335.0 times greater than other accidents. The lowest risk 
situation was at 13.0 times greater with Personnel Basket Failure and the involvement of a 
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Personal Basket Failure 
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Research Question 2 asked, “How can the use of crane accident causation factors 
assist and improve the development of more effective risk management strategies to 
improve crane safety?” This question is a mixed method one with quantitative and 
qualitative methods used. There is no hypothesis that can be retained or rejected due to the 
lack of quantitative statistics. There were 1071 occurrences of contributors to accidents out 
of 169 actual contributors. This is an average frequency of 6.33 (SD = 10.85). The most 
common are close to the mean and the rarest are far away from the mean on the bell curve 
or distribution. 
The criterion chosen was approximately one standard deviation higher than the 
mean which is a frequency of 17 or higher to include more contributory factors to the crane 
accident information. As seen in Table 16, the contributory factors, meeting the criterion 
are Overload (n = 119, 11.4%),  Improper Rigging (n = 32, 3.0%), Lack of Softeners (n = 
26, 2.4%), Load Shifts when lifted (n = 23, 2.1%), Manufacturing Defect (n = 23, 2.1%),  
Operational Aid Turned off/disconnected (n = 28, 2.6%), Operator Failed to Follow Load 
Charts (n = 23, 2.1%), Sling Failure (n = 30, 2.8%), and Structural Failure (n = 31, 2.9%). 
As seen in Table 17, Load becomes one category out of eight (n = 131, 12.23%), Worker 




Table 16: Contributors to Accidents (n = 1071) 
 
CONTRIBUTOR FREQUENCY PERCENT 
   
Abuse- Lack of Maintenance 7 .7 
Additional Load is Suddenly Applied 11 1.0 
Alterations or Repairs 2 .2 
Altered or Damaged A2B 3 .3 
Block Rigged Incorrectly 1 .1 
Boom Impact 7 .7 
Boom Overhaul 1 .1 
Boom Raising/Lowering/Extending 10 1.0 
Boom Section Suddenly Reacts 2 .2 
Boom Tip Snags on Stationary Structure 1 .1 
BTH Rebounds/Moves After Lift 2 .2 
Change Configuration- Jump 5 .5 
Component Failure 3 .3 
Connection Between Parallel Rails Fails 1 .1 
Control of Load- No Tag Line 1 .1 
Crane Improperly Setup on Rails 2 .2 
Crane Out of Level 5 .5 
Crane Re-Configuration 2 .2 
Crane Struck by Other Equipment 1 .1 
Crane Swing Lock Engaged 4 .4 
Crane Travel with Load- No Outriggers 1 .1 
Crane Travel- Impacts Stationary Object 2 .2 
Crane Unleveled 2 .2 
Crane was Rigged Improperly 2 .2 
Damage to Load 2 .2 
Defective/Damaged Rigging 5 .5 
Design Defect 3 .3 
Dismantling 14 1.3 
Displaced/Damaged Softeners 1 .1 
Dynamic Load Applied to Rigging 1 .1 
Dynamic Loading 13 1.2 
Erection 5 .5 
Failed Collar Rigging- Drop 1 .1 
Failed Component- Lug 3 .3 
Failed Rigging 2 .2 
Failure at Landed Load 2 .2 
Failure of a Wire Rope or Pendant 1 .1 






























Foundation Failure 7 .7 
Ground Support Issues 2 .2 
High Boom- Into Backstops 13 1.2 
Improper A/D Procedures 13 1.2 
Improper Adjustment to Hook/Keeper 1 .1 
Improper Crane Operation- Abuse 2 .2 
Improper Dunnage for Outriggers 3 .3 
Improper Inspection Procedures 2 .2 
Improper Maintenance/Repairs 2 .2 
Improper Removal of Pins 10 .9 
Improper Rigging 32 3.0 
Improper Stowage of Boom 2 .2 
Improper Vanning 3 .3 
Insufficient- Removed CW 7 .7 
Lack of Softeners 26 2.4 
Landed Load Cannot be Supported by Structure 2 .2 
Landed Load Not Properly Braced 12 1.1 
Landed Load Slides on Sloped Surface 1 .1 
Landed Load Snagged/Pulled Off Support 2 .2 
Lifting Device Failed 1 .1 
Load Block Not Placed on Ground 1 .1 
Load Buckles Due to Improper Rigging Attach 5 .5 
Load Disengages From BTH 6 .6 
Load Drifts Away from Crane 4 .4 
Load Drops Due to Mechanical Failure 13 1.2 
Load Is Rigged Below the C.G. 8 .7 
Load Landed and Displaced by Crane Movement 2 .2 
Load Not Properly Braced Prior to Lifted 11 1.0 
Load Pushed/Pulled-Imbalance 16 1.5 
Load Rotates 2 .2 
Load Separates/Fails 7 .7 
Load Shifts When Lifted 23 2.1 
Load Shifts While Re-Rigging 4 .4 
Load Shifts/Slides-Strikes/Displaces Load 5 .5 
Load Slides Out of Rigging 16 1.5 
Loss of Tie-In Support 1 .1 
Lost Load- Stability 8 .7 
Lug or Attachment Point on Load Fails 9 .8 
Maintenance Issue 10 .9 
















Manufacturing Issue 2 .2 
Mat Displacement 2 .2 
Mechanical Failure- Maintenance 16 1.5 
Mechanical Failure- Manufacturer 3 .3 
Moving Climbing Frame 3 .3 
Moving Crane- Change Configuration- Boom/Jib 5 .5 
No A2B Installed 1 .1 
No Outriggers- Boom Extended- No Load 2 .2 
No Outriggers- Boom Extended -Upper Swung-  
No Load 
3 .3 
No Tag Line 5 .5 
Non-Certified/Tested Rigging 2 .2 
Operational Aid Turned Off/Disconnected 28 2.6 
Operational Issues 2 .2 
Operational- Securement 3 .3 
Operational- Travel 4 .4 
Operator Directed to Land the Load 8 .7 
Operator Failed to Follow Load Charts 23 2.1 
Outrigger Down- Snags 1 .1 
Outrigger Failure- Soil 6 .6 
Outrigger Failure- Structural 5 .5 
Outriggers Not Extended 18 1.7 
Overload 119 11.4 
Overloaded- Load Testing- Certification 1 .1 
Overridden 3 .3 
Overridden LMI Or A2B 6 .6 
Overridden- A2B 7 .7 
Part of Load Comes Free- Pipe 3 .3 
Part of The Load Line Assembly Fails 10 .9 
Prior Damage/Repair to Boom/Jib 11 1.0 
Pull on Stuck Load 2 .2 
Pulling a Load-Lateral Load at Tip 4 .4 
Rigging Comes Unhooked 14 1.3 
Rigging Hooks/Snags 1 .1 
Rigging Snags/Displaces Load 12 1.1 
Side Loaded 15 1.4 
Signals 2 .2 
Sling Failure 30 2.8 
Soil Failure/Trench/Slope 9 .8 
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Structural Failure 31 2.9 
Sudden Release of Stuck Load/Vibe Hammer 2 .2 
Support Falls- Worker Falls 8 .7 
Supporting Brace is Removed 1 .1 
Swing- Dynamic Loading 3 .3 
Tag Line Snags 4 .4 
Tie-Down Design 2 .2 
Tie-In Design 1 .1 
Tower Crane Unbalanced during Jump 1 .1 
Tracks Not Extended 2 .2 
Tracks Not to Tolerances 1 .1 
Travelling the Crane-Drive/Rail 7 .7 
Travelling with a Suspended Load 6 .6 
Travelling with Load 2 .2 
Two Block-Manufacturer Design Issue 2 .2 
Unbalance-Improperly Rigged 10 .9 
Uncontrolled Load Impacts Object- Damage 1 .1 
Unsecured- Wind 4 .4 
Unstable Landing Area for Load 3 .3 
Upper Locked- No Rotation 2 .2 
Upper Not Locked-Rotates 4 .4 
Use by an Unauthorized Person 7 .7 
Wind 12 1.1 
Wind Loading- Boom/Tower 14 1.3 
Wind Loading- Load 4 .4 
Wind/ICE 1 .1 
Worker Caught in Wire Rope 3 .3 
Worker Falls from Boom/Crane 2 .2 
Worker Inserts Body into Pinch Point 4 .4 
Wrong Setup- Mode 3 .3 
Wrong Setup-Mode- LMI 3 .3 
Wrong Setup- Mode- A2B 4 .4 
Wrong Setup- Mode- LMI 3 .3 
Wrong Weight- By Others 3 .3 
Wrong Weight- Demolition 4 .4 
Wrong Weight- Fluids/Materials in Load 2 .2 
Wrong Weight- Operator 3 .3 
Wrong Weight- By Others 12 1.1 
Wrong Weight- Demolition 3 .3 
Wrong Weight- Fluids/Materials in Load 4 .4 





Table 17: No Accident, but Injuries (n=1071) 
 
INJURY FREQUENCY PERCENT 
No Injury 756 70.6 
Crane Struck by Other Equipment 2 .2 
Hit by Part of the Crane 9 .8 
Hook or Rigging Becomes Disengaged 3 .3 
Improper Crane Design 1 .1 
Inadvertent Contact with Controls 1 .1 
Lack of Maintenance of The Crane 2 .2 
Load 8 .7 
Load Drifts/Rotates 23 2.1 
Load Drops 6 .6 
Load Falls After Being Placed 15 1.4 
Load Is Snagged by Another Portion of Load 4 .4 
Load Pushed/Pulled 17 1.6 
Load Strikes a Worker 48 4.5 
Load Strikes and Causes Other Items to Collapse 19 1.8 
Maintenance 7 .7 
Operational 5 .5 
Part of Load Comes Lose/Shifts-Pipe 4 .4 
Portion of Boom or Crane Falls 1 .1 
Portion of Crane Comes Loose Striking Worker 4 .4 
Portion of Load Not Attached-Falls and Strikes 
Worker 
7 .7 
Premature Removal or Inadequate Connectors-Binder 9 .8 
Rebar Cage/Mat Collapsed- Lack of Bracing 2 .2 
Removal of Binders with Pipe-Flies Off 1 .1 
Rigging/Slings/Hook Snags Load/Object 7 .7 
Stuck Load Suddenly Releases 1 .1 
Tag Line Snags 3 .3 
Unauthorized Personnel in Lift Zone 5 .5 
Unintended Movement of The Crane 2 .2 
Unintended Operation of BTH 2 .2 















Wrong Weight- Operator 9 .8 
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Worker Caught in or Struck by Wire Rope 5 .5 
Worker Caught or Struck by Outrigger 5 .5 
Worker Climbs on Load 12 1.1 
Worker Crushed/Run Over by Crane 9 .8 
Worker Inserts Body in Pinch Point(s) 19 1.8 
Worker Moves Portion of Crane- Pinched 7 .7 
 





Worker Snagged by Tag Line/Wire Rope 1 .1 
Worker Struck by Ball or Block 10 .9 
Worker Struck by Crane Swing 5 .5 
Worker Walks into Load 21 2.0 
4.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 The original database was in Microsoft Excel and contained 108 variables involved 
in 701 crane accidents from 1983 to 2017 crane accidents. The criterion of what needs to 
have happened to include a crane accident case was a three-fold process. First, by expert 
consensus, it was agreed that a minimum number of sources for all cases that “qualified” 
to be input into the databases needed to be operationalized. At least one outside source of 
information not prepared by the research was required to be included in the study. Further, 
an actual video of the accident, of which there were many, could supplement for an outside 
source. At least three of the following were the primary sources of information relied upon 
for each evaluation.   
A population size of total crane accidents over the 35-year period was calculated 
based on fatal crane statistics documented between 1992 and 2016.  Average annual death 
rates were 6.36 for the study and 34.72 per OSHA.  A sample size of 701 accidents with 
an estimated population of 5,833 would yield a confidence level of 99% with a 4.55% 
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margin of error. If a 20% factor is applied for unreported non-fatal accidents, the estimated 
total would yield an estimated population of 7,000 accidents.  A sample size of 701 would 
equate to a 99% confidence level with a 4.6% margin of error.   
On Crane Capacity, an interesting trend occurs with 15 to 99 tons being involved 
in 380 crane accidents followed by 100 to 199 tons and 200 to 299 tons, where the lowest 
numbers of accidents occur with the highest tonnage. Thirty accidents at 300 to 599 tons 
and eight at greater than 600 tons.  Next, First Crane Type, Mobile Hydraulic, and Track-
Lattice accounted for 346 of all crane accidents. On the other hand, 22 other First Crane 
Types account for 54.3% of all crane accidents. For Second Crane Type, the same pattern 
emerged with Mobile Hydraulic and Track-Lattice being involved in the most accidents 
and three other types following in low. Further investigation into Mobile Hydraulic and 
Track-Lattice Cranes is suggested. 
Multinomial logistic regression was used to explain data and the relationship 
between one nominal dependent variable and one or more continuous-level (interval or 
ratio scale) independent variables (Menard 2010). This statistic was run to examine 
Research Question 1, which stated, “Do the duties and responsibilities established by 
ASME B30.5 appropriately address associated causes of crane accidents by all responsible 
parties?”  Additionally, this statistic was run to determine if the null hypothesis (below) 
was retained. All six assumptions were met. 
     Multinomial regression was run using the dependent variable of 1-Person 
Accident and 1-Person Primary Responsibility, and the result was statistically significant, 
and this meant that 74.3% of one-person accidents were explained by one-person 
responsibilities. The null hypothesis was rejected, and the duties and responsibilities 
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established by ASME B30.5 do address appropriately associated causes of crane accidents 
by all responsible parties. 
Table 6, showed the accident type and the responsible party from 1-person 
accidents. Starting with an accident on assembly/disassembly, the presence of a Service 
Provider (SP) caused the Odds Risk Ratio (ORR) to rise from 1.0 to 6485.089 times the 
probability of an accident occurring. For the SP, the range of accidental probability range 
goes, for an accident to occur goes from 2.978 (Worker Contacted by Load No Accident) 
to 1,186,610,348,000,000,000.000 (Unstable/Dropped/Lost Load). The rest of the 
responsibilities increase accidents somewhere between 2.0 to 16.0). The data from 2 and 
3-person accidents and 1 and two responsible were not statistically significant.  
Research Question 2 asked, “How can the use of crane accident causation factors 
assist and improve the development of more effective risk management strategies to 
improve crane safety?” This question is a mixed method one with quantitative and 
qualitative methods used. There is no hypothesis that can be retained or rejected due to the 
lack of quantitative statistics. There were 1071 occurrences of contributors to accidents out 
169 actual contributors. This is an average frequency of 6.33 (SD = 10.85).  The most 
common are close to the mean, and the rarest are far away from the mean on the bell curve 
or distribution. 
The criterion chosen was approximately one standard deviation higher than the 
mean which is a frequency of 17 or higher to include more contributory factors to the crane 
accident information. As seen in Table 16, the contributory factors, meeting the criterion 
are Overload, Improper Rigging, Lack of Softeners, Load Shifts when lifted, 
Manufacturing Defect, Operational Aid Turned off/disconnected, Operator failed to follow 
load charts, Sling Failure, and Structural Failure. As seen in Table 17, Load becomes one 
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category out of eight, Worker inserts body in pinch point(s), and Worker walks into the 





Chapter 5 – Conclusions and Recommendations 
Accident analyses, particularly crane accident analyses, have been limited in 
number and in scope. Existing research regarding crane accident information has often 
been limited to fatality data, made available through OSHA-generated IMIS data. IMIS 
data lacks analyses concerning accident causation but rather are more concentrated on 
violations of code and deviations from standard industry practices.  
The researcher of this study provided a large database, which included research 
collected over a 30-year period, that comprised information developed through forensic 
analyses of crane accidents which would have conclusive data associated with causation 
and assigned responsible parties in order to fill the gap from typical use of IMIS data.  
Through analyzing the data available, from 701 forensically evaluated crane accidents, the 
researcher has provided recommendations for future research and practice based upon his 
findings.   
After statistical testing, during which the researcher analyzed crane accident data, 
the researcher noted key causative factors that influence crane accidents, particularly those 
involving injuries and fatalities. To further extend the research findings presented, the 
research conducted qualitative analyses and has made recommendations based upon said 
analyses. Chapter 5 presents the researcher’s conclusions and recommendations that have 
been made based upon the study’s guiding research questions.  It is the hope of the 
researcher that recommendations made will assist all industries that use cranes and thereby 
reduce accidents, injuries, and fatalities if applied. 
5.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 1  
Multinomial logistic regression methods have assisted researchers, including this 
study’s researcher, in explaining the data and the relationships between single nominal 
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dependent variables and one or more continuous-level (i.e., interval or ratio scale) 
independent variables (Menard 2010). This method of analysis addressed Research 
Question 1, which stated, “Do the duties and responsibilities established by ASME B30.5 
appropriately address associated causes of crane accidents by all responsible parties?” 
Also, this approach sought to determine if the null hypothesis (below) was retained. 
H01. The duties and responsibilities established by ASME B30.5 (Figure 8) do not 
address appropriately associated causes of crane accidents by all responsible parties. 
HA1. The duties and responsibilities established by ASME B30.5 do address 
appropriately associated causes of crane accidents by all responsible parties. 
 
Figure 8: Responsibility Flowchart 
Multinomial regression was run using the dependent variable of 1-Person Accident 
and 1-Person Primary Responsibilities. The result of the multinomial regression was that 
the Nagelkerke R2 was equal to .743 and was found to be significant at X 2 (190) = 947.692, 
p < 0.0001 (Table 13). This result means that 74.3% of 1-Person Accidents were explained 
by 1-Person Primary Responsibilities. The null hypothesis, therefore, is rejected, thus the 
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duties and responsibilities established by ASME B30.5 appropriately address associated 
causes of crane accidents. 
5.1.1 Research Question 1 Recommendations 
Analyses indicate that the duties and responsibilities of crane lift personnel, as 
specified by ASME, are effectively addressed. However, several issues that were identified 
during the study direct attention to Manufacturers of Loads/Lifting Instructions/Lugs and 
Mechanical/Maintenance/Inspection Issues. Currently, there are no specific requirements 
for Manufacturers of Loads to provide any lifting instructions or sufficient information 
regarding the load, particularly the location of the center-of-gravity, to enable crews to 
control and lift loads safely without multiple test lifts. Additionally, accident analysis 
confirmed that while some manufacturers do provide lifting lugs, unfortunately, too often 
these lifting lugs are located below the center-of-gravity, thereby resulting in a condition 
that results in suspended load instability or even “flipping,” during hoisting process.   
Crated cargo that is off-loaded from ships often arrives with no information 
regarding weight and center-of-gravity designations. The Lift Director, who is responsible 
for controlling the lift, must make determinations and provide instructions for proper 
rigging. The Lift Director needs proper and complete instructions for every load to be lifted 
and placed. A secondary responsibility of the Lift Director should be to confirm the 
availability of handling instructions/information. Providing this information, regarding 
handling instructions, would be the primary responsibility of the Load Manufacturer(s).  
Through access to and proper use of this information, it is likely that there will be a 
reduction of occurrences of unstable, dropped, and lost loads, which was noted as one of 
the most frequent types of accidents identified in this study. 
102 
 
Mechanical/Maintenance/Inspection Issues, which are addressed within the ASME 
standard, are currently limited to personnel qualifications. ASME standards are limited 
regarding procedures required to complete effective and proper crane inspections, 
particularly in regard to annual inspections. Based upon study results of accident causation, 
the researcher recommends that Crane Manufacturers provide a detailed checklist, which 
specifies proper instructional methods for crane operations. Though Crane Manufacturers 
do detail most mechanical issues and maintenance items, as outlined in Maintenance and 
Operations/Operator’s Manual, inspections are only confined to a list of items. Inspection 
issues not identified in the manuals provided are an ever-growing issue, specifically given 
the complexity of cranes. Therefore, it is recommended that another responsibility 
requirement, for maintenance/inspection, involve the creation of a manual detailing 
information about mechanical, maintenance, and inspection issues and specific procedures 
for each.  
One of the most difficult inspections involved in crane operations is the “running” 
of the wire rope, which is located in the boom hoist assembly and load line. Qualified 
personnel must follow specific guidelines set forth by the ASME standard, noted by the 
manufacturer, for crane and wire rope operations.  Guidelines should be created, which 
identify critical inspection items, as well as proper methods for conducting those 
inspections. Given this lack of guidelines, many inventive inspection methods have been 
created by inspectors without any specific guidance from the wire rope or Crane 
Manufacturers. Due to the difficulty of inspecting wire rope, it is believed that an estimated 
useful life should be provided by the wire rope manufacturer. 
The researcher, based upon the study findings, has identified that one of the most 
frequent types of major accidents is due to Unstable/Dropped/Lost Load. A number of 
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these incidents are related to load manufacturer failures, since these manufacturers do not 
provide adequate information/direction as to how to rig the load, which will thereby 
prevent unintended movement once the load is in the air. Serious incidents associated with 
these types of accidents include workers being struck when the load was being lifted or 
when workers attempted to grab or hold the load to prevent its movement. Load movement, 
or drifting, is common in the crane industry due to boom deflections, particularly hydraulic 
crane booms. Normal procedures associated with load movement include raising the load 
several inches (normally 6-12 inches) to ensure the load is stable before continuing with 
the lift. Rigging personnel must stand clear of the load to prevent getting struck if the load 
moves/drifts. Currently, Lift Directors are responsible for the placement of personnel and 
for deciding if tag lines should be used. Lift Directors should be provided with detailed 
instructions regarding precise details concerning load movements, specifically in regard to 
the potential for the load striking the workers. These directives are especially important 
when project personnel are in tight quarters during which the prevalence of a worker being 
crushed is increased. Similar directives should be provided in Rigger responsibilities so 
they understand the importance of maintaining a distance from the load to avoid potential 
crushing points should the load drift/move. 
5.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 2  
Research Question 2 utilized a quantitative analysis to answer the question of, 
“How can the use of crane accident causation factors to assist and improve the development 
of more effective risk management strategies to improve crane safety?” As part this 
analysis, the researcher performed multinomial regressions to determine relative risks 
associated with various crane operations.  Relative risks ratios assess the probability of an 
event occurring by comparing the incident or risk associated with an event to the exposure 
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of parties or lack of exposure of parties. Relative risk is based upon the incidence of an 
event occurrence since participants are already identified and their corresponding exposure 
status is identified.   
Large odds ratios are far more inaccurate than relative risk ratios, as it is always 
further away from 1.0 then relative risk (Andrade 2015). So, the suggestion is to use relative 
risk when odds ratios are very large (Andrade 2015), such as Assembly/Disassembly where 
the ORR fell from 6485.089 to the RR of 73.0 (Tables 14 and 15).  The 1-Person Accident 
Types were the largest, as noted in Table 14, which were converted to RR. Within Table15, 
one can clearly see the drop-in estimation. Relative risk ratios should be used in Table 15 
since they are more accurate. In Table 15, the highest risk situation was Crane Overturn 
involving the fault or cause of the Service Provider, which was 335.0 times greater, in 
regard to risk, than other accidents identified. The lowest risk situation was at 13.0 times 
greater with Personnel Basket Failure and the involvement of a Service Provider. Risk 
Ratio for an unstable, dropped, or lost load is 222.3365 times greater when a Service 
Provider is involved. The aforementioned findings denote specific hazards associated with 
Service Providers who are assigned to a new worksite and are working alongside a new 
crane, which often occurs on many projects in which a crane and operator are rented to 
perform a lift.  
Well documented research has noted that when changes in a work environment 
occur, there is an increased probability of accident occurrences. Accidents affect workers 
and the public (Attwood et al. 2006; Georgiadou 2001; Hofmann et al. 1995; Papadopoulos 
2003; Rasmussen 1997; Uth and Wiese 2004, 2006; Zwetsloot and Hale 2002; Zwetsloot 
et al. 2007).  Research studies also indicate that subcontractors, such as Service Providers 
who conduct work/tasks on job sites, are prone to major accidents, specifically due to a 
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dearth of training, as well as inadequate monitoring of work safety practices (Dechy et al. 
2004; Uth and Wiese 2004). When companies use subcontractors in high risk workplaces 
(i.e., chemical plants, construction sites, maintenance worksites, etc.) it is often more 
difficult to coordinate work activities, to implement OSHA  v measures, and to mitigate 
site hazards (Papadopoulos et al. 2010). The utilization of subcontractors may result in 
serious accidents, thereby affecting public safety given the worksite hazards present. 
An additional factor that can influence the frequency of job site injuries is the 
employment of agency, seasonal, on-call, and new/inexperienced workers.  Occupational 
Health and Safety investigations have found that accident rates for such workers can be 
substantially more than accident rates for seasoned employees (Underhill and Quinlan 
2011).  Workers who have been on the job for short periods of time are more frequently 
involved in accidents.  Heinrich et al. (1950) orated that accidents result from unsafe acts 
(i.e., deviations from normally accepted safety procedures) or unsafe conditions (i.e., 
deficiencies in machines and materials). Researchers have found that 88% of accidents are 
the result of unsafe acts and 10% of accidents are due to unsafe conditions (Heinrich et al. 
1950). Garrett and Teizer (2009) noted that human error serves as the primary reason for 
as many as 80% of all accidents in high-risk industries (i.e., construction, mining, and 
nuclear power plant operations). Unsafe behavior and unsafe conditions are recognized as 
the primary reasons for construction site accidents (example: when workers are not 
familiar with crane operating procedures; Wang et al. 2015). 
5.2.1 Research Question 2 Recommendations 
The Service Provider situation is unique, especially considering that these 
individuals often work in new locations and with a new crew (comprised of new workers 
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with limited prior experience). Below are some of the work environment and crew changes 
that a Service Provider is exposed to during contracted projects:  
• Changing worksites (environments) on a regular, if not daily, basis. 
• Working in many different industry sectors, which all have different requirements 
and standards of operation. 
• Working with various types of loads, on a regular basis, therefore preventing 
stability. 
• Long, unscheduled periods of work. 
• Locations that are less than optimal for the assigned lift, which include: 
o Spatial conflicts (i.e., oversized or undersized cranes). 
o Larger projects that require considerable planning.  
• Working under the sole direction of the Lift Director, which means: 
o There is an infrequency of pre-lift meetings conducted to ensure that 
workers know their roles and responsibilities. 
o Service Providers are rarely involved in the lift planning process. 
o Service Providers are given incorrect weight or inaccurate project 
information.  
• Clients and/or crews often are unsophisticated/untrained regarding lifting 
operations and procedures. 
• Often times, the assignment involves working with inexperienced crews, especially 
when on smaller jobs. 
o It is not uncommon for new riggers, who are inexperienced, to get too close 
to the load. 
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o Due to inadequate training, loads are often rigged incorrectly and become 
unstable (i.e., loads drift, flip, or rotate).  
• Service Providers are often required to work with crew members who they have not 
worked with before. 
• New Signal Persons, assigned to the project, must ensure they understand signals 
and therefore, these individuals often rely on the Lift Director to identify all site 
hazards. 
Through conducting this analysis, the researcher has identified two critical issues 
that need to be addressed. As noted in the study findings, when Service Providers 
coordinate crane operations, there is often an increased frequency of incidents, specifically 
due to Unstable/Dropped/Lost Load. Worksite changes, which are frequent in nature, are 
problematic for Service Providers.  In fact, when a Service Provider is working with a new 
crew, all inherent dangers must be addressed. One’s ability to recognize such dangers is 
compounded by the complexities of working with new individuals on a site that they are 
unfamiliar with. A Service Provider often times has little formal control, on the worksite, 
and therefore, he/she must rely on the persons who are conducting the lift to ensure that all 
parties understand the lifting plan. Often times, pre-lift meetings are held to ensure that the 
lift crew, consisting of personnel from different trades/industries, are familiar with the 
project.  However, given trade/industry differences, as well as little familiarity in regard to 
party roles/responsibilities, it is difficult to conduct a safe lift. It is highly recommended 
that all lifts be preceded by pre-lift meetings, particularly when a Service Provider is 
involved. An effective pre-lift meeting identifies every party and details associated roles 
and responsibilities that are discussed and assigned prior to the lift.  Recommendations for 
conducting an effective pre-lift meeting should include the following: 
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• Confirmation of the qualifications and certifications of all crane lift personnel. 
• Overview of the load handling activity. 
• Conducting a Job Hazard Analysis regarding the lift (including worker 
positioning, potential obstructions along the load path- crane swing, personnel 
positioning, and personal protection equipment; PPE). 
• Confirmation that the load path does not pass over any site personnel. 
• Discussion regarding the load, specifically focusing on confirming that proper 
rigging equipment and rigging methods are used. 
• Discussion of the sequential steps associated with the lift, as well as the roles 
and responsibilities of all parties, which includes discussion of the: 
o Placement and locations of personnel during the lift.  
o Confirmation of the load’s stability. 
o Required lift signals.  
o Signal Person transfer from the ground to final location.  
o Confirmation that the landing area is sufficient to support the load.  
• Identification of communication methods (i.e., hand signal or wireless) between 
the crew and the operator. 
• Discussions of Stop Work authority and processes, during the lift process, if 
anyone detects a hazard not previously identified. 
• Confirmation by all crew members that they understand their roles and agree to 
the plan set forth. 
• Discussions concerning contingency options if the lift does not go as planned. 
Unfortunately, verbal communication efforts among the Lift Director, Lift Crew, 
and the Crane Operator, who is contracted by a Service Provider, are lacking, as these 
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individuals have little time to interact and understand the roles of all parties. The use of a 
pre-lift meeting would not be disruptive, thereby affording all crew members, as well as 
the Crane Operator, with the opportunity to discuss the steps of the lift and load placement 
locations. From a Service Provider’s standpoint, the pre-lift meeting is a critical need, 
especially as confirmed by this research study, which notes that inherent high risks are 
present for Service Providers involved in projects due to lacking experience/engagement 
with the crew and worksite.  
5.3 FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS 
Crane accident analyses, based on forensic causation techniques, is a promising and 
undeveloped area of research. The use of a large database provides detailed information 
about crane accident causes, thereby enabling the potential implementation of corrective 
measures to improve crane safety operations. Recommended future study areas include: 
• Addressing initiating and contributing factors that have led to repeated and/or 
similar accidents. 
• Development of more proactive inspection procedures and load stability 
evaluations. 
• Examination of what safety issues were present that led to accidents/injuries 
when there was no load on the hook. 
• Examination of injuries and fatalities when, by this researcher’s definition, an 
accident did not occur. 
• A study of number and types of accidents associated with: 
o Union versus non-union operators. 
o Value and size of the project. 
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5.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Research findings have demonstrated that many parties must be involved in the 
planning and execution of crane lifts. As demonstrated by the findings of this study, it is 
imperative that all lift planning information be provided to all crew members and that all 
crew members agree with the plan before initiating a lift. Accident trend examinations have 
indicated that certification procedures have improved, in regard to Crane Operator 
responsibilities. Additionally, through analyses, the researcher has identified that personnel 
involved in crane lifts, such as the Lift Director, need further direction and education, 
specifically in regard to their roles, responsibilities, training, etc. It is the hope of this 
researcher that future studies explore how crane accidents can be minimized/prevented, 
thereby decreasing the likelihood of accidents, injuries, and deaths. Results of this study, 
as well as those to follow, should be provided to national standards groups and to 








1 Year of Accident  
 Case ID No  
 Haag Job Name  
 Haag Job Number  
2 Date of Incident  
3 Time of Incident  
4 City  
 State  
5 Number of Injuries  











7 Union  
 Non-Union  
8 Number of Deaths  











10 Estimated Property Damage  












Oilfield- Land Base 
Oilfield- Offshore 
Residential Construction 
13 Type of Lift Being Performed 
Assembly/Disassembly 






Standard Production Lift 
 
14 Type of Crane Operation 
Bare Lease/Operated 
Borrowed or Unauthorized Use 
Owned/Operated by User 
Service Provider-Operator 
 




Concrete Tilt- Wall Construction 





Maintenance on Crane 









Steel Erection-Steel Girders- Rebar 
Structural Steel Platforms 
Swinging/Booming/Operations- No Load 
Transmission Towers- Cell Towers 
Traveling with Load 
Traveling with No Load 
Wood Beams or Trusses 
 









Landed Load-Stability Failure 
Other 
Personnel Basket Accident 
Power Line Contact 
Rigging Failure 
Signaling 
Slewing Assembly Failure 
Trip/Slip/Fall/Jump from Crane 
Two Block 
Unstable/Dropped/Lost Load 
Worker Contact by Crane- No Accident 
Worker Contact by Load- No Accident 
17 Load-No Load 
Load on the Hook 
No Load on the Hook 
 
18 Property-Equipment Damage 
Damage to Equipment/Crane 
Damage to Property 
Damage to Property & Equipment 





Injuries & Deaths 
No Deaths 
No Injuries or Deaths 
No Injuries 
 
20 Description of Accident  
21 Conclusions of Causes  
22 Resources Used 
Deposition 
Depositions/Statements of Witnesses 
Document Review 
Incident Report Provided 
Inspection 
OSHA File Provided 
Photographs 

































25 Crane Manufacturer  











Special- Gin Pole 
Special- Launching Girder 
Special- Log Boom 
Special- Marine 
Special- Side Boom 
Special- Straddle Crane 







27 Crane Model (UNK if not known)  
28 Serial Number (UNK if not known)  
29 Year of Manufacture (UNK if not known)  
30 Crane Capacity  
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Less than 2 Tons 
2 to 14 Tons 
15 to 99 Tons 
100 to 199 Tons 
200 to 299 Tons 
300 to 599 Tons 
Greater than 600 Tons 
31 Boom Length 
0 to 50 Feet 
51 to 100 Feet 
101 to 150 Feet 
151 to 200 Feet 
201 to 250 Feet 
251 to 300 Feet 
301 to 350 Feet 
351 to 400 Feet 








33 Lift Data 1 
Operator Certified 
Operator Not Certified 
 
34 Lift Data 2 
Written Lift Plan 
No Written Lift Plan 
 
35 Lift Data 3 
Pre-Lift Meeting 
No Pre-Lift Meeting 
 
36 Lift Data 4 
Not Applicable 
Blind Lift 
Maintenance on Crane 
 
37I Crane Stability- Overturn Initiating 
Not Applicable 
Abuse- Lack of Maintenance 
Additional Load is Suddenly Applied 
Altered or Damaged A2B 
Crane Out of Level 
Failed Component-Lug 
Failure at Landed Load 
Foundation Failure 
Improper A/D Procedures 
Insufficient- Removed CW 
Lifting Device Failed 







No Outriggers- Boom Extended- No Load 
Outrigger Failure- Soil 
Outrigger Failure- Structural 
Outriggers Not Extended 
Overload 
Overridden- A2B 






Swing- Dynamic Loading 
Travelling the Crane- Drive/Rail 
Travelling with a Suspended Load 
Upper Not Locked- Rotates 
Use by an Unauthorized Person 
Wind 
Wrong Setup- Mode- A2B 
Wrong Weight- By Others 
Wrong Weight- Demolition 
Wrong Weight- Fluids/Materials in Load 
Wrong Weight- Not Known 
Wrong Weight- Operator 
37C Crane Stability- Overturn Contributing 
Not Applicable 
Abuse-Lack of Maintenance 
Additional Load is Suddenly Applied 
Altered or Damaged A2B 
Crane Out of Level 
Failed Component- Lug 
Failure at Landed Load 
Foundation Failure 
Improper A/D Procedures 
Insufficient- Removed CW 
Lifting Device Failed 




No Outriggers- Boom Extended- No Load 
Outrigger Failure- Soil 
Outrigger Failure- Structural 
Outriggers Not Extended 
Overload 
Overridden- A2B 









Swing- Dynamic Loading 
Travelling the Crane- Drive/Rail 
Travelling with a Suspended Load 
Upper Not Locked- Rotates 
Use by an Unauthorized Person 
Wind 
Wrong Setup- Mode- A2B 
Wrong Weight- By Others 
Wrong Weight- Demolition 
Wrong Weight- Fluids/Materials in Load 
Wrong Weight- Not Known 
Wrong Weight- Operator 
38I Boom/Jib/Tower Collapse Initiating 
Not Applicable 
Abuse- Lack of Maintenance 
Additional Load is Suddenly Applied 
Altered or Damaged A2B 
Boom Impact 
Crane Struck by Load- Non-operational 
Crane was Rigged Improperly 
Dynamic Loading 
Engineering Issue- Demo 
Failed Component- Lug 
Failure at Landed Load 
Foundation Design 
High Boom- Into Backstops 
Maintenance Issue 
Manufacturing Issue 
Operational Aid Turned Off/Disconnected 
Overloaded 
Overridden A2B 




Sudden Release of Hammer 
Tie-In Design 
Use by an Unauthorized Person 
Wind Loading- Boom/Tower 
Wind Loading- Load 
Wrong Setup-Mode- A2B 
Wrong Weight- By others 
Wrong Weight- Demolition 
Wrong Weight- Fluids/Materials in Load 




Wrong Weight- Operator 
38C Boom/Jib/Tower Collapse Initiating 
Not Applicable 
Abuse- Lack of Maintenance 
Additional Load is Suddenly Applied 
Altered or Damaged A2B 
Boom Impact 
Crane Struck by Load- Non-operational 
Crane was Rigged Improperly 
Dynamic Loading 
Engineering Issue- Demo 
Failed Component- Lug 
Failure at Landed Load 
Foundation Design 
High Boom- Into Backstops 
Maintenance Issue 
Manufacturing Issue 
Operational Aid Turned Off/Disconnected 
Overloaded 
Overridden A2B 





Use by an Unauthorized Person 
Wind Loading- Boom/Tower 
Wind Loading- Load 
Wrong Setup- Mode- A2B 
Wrong Weight- By Others 
Wrong Weight- Demolition 
Wrong Weight- Fluids/Materials in Load 
Wrong Weight- Not Known 
Wrong Weight- Operator 
 
39 Two Blocking 
Not Applicable 
Altered or Damaged A2B 
Manufacturing Defect 
No A2B Installed 
Operational Aid Turned Off/Disconnected 
Overridden 
Use by an Unauthorized Person 
Wrong Setup- Mode 
 
40 Assembly- Disassembly Process 
Not Applicable 
Change Configuration- Jump 
Dismantling 
Erection  




41I Assembly- Disassembly Initiating 
Not Applicable 
Ball or Block Falls during Assembly 
Brake Failure 
Crane Improperly Setup 
Failure of a Wire Rope or Pendant 
Manufacturing Issue 
Worker Caught in Wire Rope 
Worker Falls from Boom/Crane 
Worker Removes Wrong Pin 
 
42 E1-Worker Contacted by Crane- Accident Contributing 
Not Applicable 
Hit by Part of the Crane 
Maintenance  
Portion of Boom or Crane Falls 
Portion of Crane Comes Loose Striking Worker 
Worker Caught in or Struck by Wire Rope 
Worker Caught or Struck by Outrigger 
Worker Crushed/Run Over by Crane 
Worker Moves Portion of Crane- Pinched 
Worker Struck by Ball or Block 
Worker Struck by Crane Swing 
 
43 E2- Worker Contract by Load- Accident Contributing 
Not Applicable 
Crane Overturned 
Crane Struck by Other Equipment 
Hook or Rigging Becomes Disengaged 
Lack of Maintenance of the Crane 
Load Becomes Unstable when Lifted 
Load Drifts/Rotates 
Load Falls After Being Placed 
Load Is Snagged by Other Portion of Load 
Load Pushed/Pulled 
Load Strikes a Worker 
Load Strikes and Causes Other Items to Collapse 
Maintenance Issue on Lifting Device 
Operational 
Part of Load Comes Lose/Shifts-Pipe 
Portion of Load Not Attached- Falls and Strikes Worker- 
Demolition 
Premature Removal or Inadequate Connectors- Binders 
Rebar Cage/Mat Collapsed- Lack of Bracing 
Removal of Binders with Pipe- Flies Off 
Rigging Failure Disrupts Load 
Rigging/Slings/Hook Snags Load/Object 
Tag Line Snags 
Unauthorized Personnel in Lift Zone 
Wind  
Worker Inserts Body in Pinch Point(s) 




Worker Walks into Load 
44 Worker Contacted by Crane No Accident Contributing 
Not Applicable 
Hit by Part of The Crane 
Maintenance  
Portion of Boom or Crane Falls 
Portion of Crane Comes Loose Striking Worker 
Worker Caught in or Struck by Wire Rope 
Worker Caught or Struck by Outrigger 
Worker Crushed/Run Over by Crane 
Worker Moves Portion of Crane-Pinched 
Worker Struck by Ball or Block 
Worker Struck by Crane Swing 
 
45 Worker Contacted by Load No Accident Contributing 
Not Applicable 
Crane Struck by Other Equipment 
Hook or Rigging Becomes Disengaged 
Lack of Maintenance of the Crane 
Load Becomes Unstable When Lifted 
Load Drifts/Rotates 
Load Falls After Being Placed 
Load Is Snagged by other Portion of Load 
Load Pushed/Pulled 
Load Strikes a Worker 
Load Strikes and Causes Other Items to Collapse 
Maintenance Issue on Lifting Device 
Operational 
Part of Load Comes Lose/Shifts- Pipe 
Portion of Load Not Attached- Falls and Strikes Worker- 
Demolition 
Premature Removal or Inadequate Connectors- Binders 
Rebar Cage/Mat Collapsed- Lack of Bracing 
Removal of Binders with Pipe- Flies Off 
Rigging Failure Disrupts Load 
Rigging/Slings/Hook Snags Load/Object 
Tag Line Snags 
Unauthorized Personnel in Lift Zone 
Wind  
Worker Inserts Body in Pinch Point(s) 
Worker Inserts Part of Body in Pinch Point 
Worker Snagged by Load- Non-Accidental 
Worker Walks into Load 
 
46I Boom Dropped Initiating 
Not Applicable 
Boom Dropped During Erection 
Boom Dropped During Operation 
Jib Dropped During Erection 
Jib Dropped During Operation 
 




Boom Hoist Brake Failure 
Boom Hoist Wire Rope Failure 
Boom Over Backwards- Stability 
Improper Inspection/Maintenance 
Jib Pendant Failure 
Jib Support Failure 
Manufacturing Defect 
Prior Damage to Boom 
Unauthorized Crane Operation 
Uncertified Rigging in Boom 
46JI Jib Displacement Initiating 
Not Applicable 
Boom Extended- Pins Not Removed 
Failed to Follow Manufacturer’s Instructions 
Improper Inspection/Maintenance 
Jib Bracket Failure 
Jib Erection- Operator 
Jib Erection- Rigger 
Jib Not Properly Secured to Side of Boom 
Jib Rigged Improperly 
Manufacturing Defect 
Pin Not Engaged Sufficiently 
Pins Not Removed 
Prior Damage to Jib Assembly 
Unauthorized Repairs 
Unauthorized Use 
Wrong Pins Removed 
 
46JC Jib Displacement Contribution 
Not Applicable 
Jib Fell During Crane Travel 
Jib Fell During Erection- Mechanic 
Jib Fell During Erection- Operator 
Jib Fell During Erection- Rigger 
Jib Fell During Operation 
Jib Fell During Stowage- Mechanic 
Jib Fell During Stowage- Operator 
Jib Fell During Stowage- Rigger 
 
47I Rigging Failure Initiating 
Not Applicable 
Component Failure 
Control of Load- No Tag Line 
Sling Failure 
Spreader Beam Failure 
Unbalance- Improperly Rigged 
 
47C Rigging Failure Contributing 
Not Applicable 
Defective/Damaged Rigging  





Unbalance- Improperly Rigged 
48I Unstable/Dropped/Lost Load Initiating 
Not Applicable 
Brake Fails- Drops Load 
Failed Rigging 
Load Buckles Due to Improper Rigging Attach. 
Load is Rigged Below the C.G. 
Load Landed and Displaced by Crane Movement 
Load Not Properly Braced Prior to Lifted 
Load Shifts While Re-Rigging 
Load Shifts When Lifted 
Lug or Attachment Point on Load Fails 
Manufacturing Defect 
Mechanical Failure- Maintenance 
Mechanical Failure- Manufacturer 
Mechanical Failure- Repair/Replacement 
Operational 
Part of Load Comes Free- Pipe 
Part of the Load Line Assembly Fails 
Rigging Comes Unhooked 
Tag Line Snags 
Wind 
 
48C Unstable/Dropped/Lost Load Contributing 
Not Applicable 
Failed Rigging 
Load Buckles Due to Improper Rigging Attach. 
Load is Rigged Below the C.G. 
Load Landed and Displaced by Crane Movement 
Load Landed and Unfolds When Landed 
Load Not Properly Braced Prior to Lifted 
Load Shifts While Re-Rigging 
Load Shifts When Lifted 
Load Strikes and Causes Other Items to Collapse 
Lug or Attachment Point on Load Fails 
Manufacturing Defect 
Mechanical Failure- Maintenance 
Mechanical Failure- Manufacturer 
Mechanical Failure- Repair/Replacement 
Operational 
Part of Load Comes Free- Pipe 
Part of the Load Line Assembly Fails 
Rigging Comes Unhooked 
Tag Line Snags 
Wind 
 








Rigger Pulls Load Line into Power 
Static Electricity- Microwave Towers 
50 Slewing Assembly Failure 
Not Applicable 
Excessive Loading- Operations 











51C Crane Derailment Contributing 
Not Applicable 
Connection Between Parallel Rails Fails 




Tracks Not to Tolerances 
 
52I Landed Load- Stability Initiating 
Not Applicable 
Landed Load Cannot be Supported by Structure 
Operator Directed to Land the Load 
Operator Landed the Load 
Unstable Landing Area for Load 
 
52C Landed Load Stability Contributing 
Not Applicable 
Landed Load Cannot be Supported by Structure 
Load Becomes Unstable After Disconnected 
Load is Not Braced and Falls 
Unstable Landing Area for Load 
 
53 Lifting Personnel-Basket 
Not Applicable 
Basket Failed 
Basket Not Certified/Tested 
Basket Struck Object 
Improper Assembly of Crane 
Load Line Comes Off Sheave 
No Trial Run 
Rigging/Load Line Failure 
Wind 
Worker Not Tied Off 
 





Personnel Falls/Jumps from Platform 
Personnel Jumps from the Crane 
Personnel Trips/Slips While on the Crane 
55 Signaling 
Not Applicable 
Failure to Have Clear Visibility of Load 





Cracked Component Found During Inspection 
Other Object Strikes Crane 
Outrigger Damages Underground Utilities 
Worker Inserts Part of Body in Pinch Point 
 
57 Critical Lifts 
Not Applicable 












Critical lift: Any lift utilizing multiple cranes is always a critical lift.  Other criteria would 
be the weight of the equipment to be lifted as compared to the allowable lift, the swing area 
of the lift, the overall risk, difficulty, or complexity of the lift, toxicity of the product being 
lifted, and other considerations at the discretion of the producer of the lift plan. Critical lifts 
require individual lift plans. 
General lifts: Are lifts that are neither critical lifts or production lifts. These lifts need not 
be listed. Example of a general lift is offloading materials from a trailer. 
Production lifts: Production lifts are repetitive and do not fall into the classification of a 
critical lift. Production lifts may all be covered by one lift plan that outlines the parameters 
and the equipment to be utilized in the lifts as well as the procedures associated with the 
lift. Example of a production lift is steel erection. 
 
MOBILE CRANE TYPES 
Commercial truck mounted crane: A crane consisting of a rotating superstructure (center 
post or turntable), boom, operating machinery, and one or more operator’s stations 
mounted on a frame attached to a commercial truck chassis, usually retaining a payload 
hauling capability whose power source usually powers the crane. Its function is to lift, 
lower, and swing loads at various radii (see Figs. 5-0.2.1-1 and 5-0.2.1-2). 
Crawler crane: A crane consisting of a rotating superstructure with a power plant, 
operating machinery, and boom, mounted on a base and equipped with crawler treads for 
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travel. Its function is to lift, lower, and swing loads at various radii (see Figs. 5-0.2.1-3 and 
5-0.2.1-4). 
Locomotive crane: A crane consisting of a rotating superstructure with a power plant, 
operating machinery, and boom, mounted on a base or car equipped for travel on a railroad 
track. This type of crane may be self-propelled or propelled by an outside source. Its 
function is to lift, lower, and swing loads at various radii (see Fig. 5-0.2.1-5). 
Wheel-mounted crane (multiple control stations): A crane consisting of a rotating 
superstructure, operating machinery, and operator’s station and boom, mounted on a crane 
carrier equipped with axles and rubber-tired wheels for travel, a power source(s), and 
having separate stations for driving and operating. Its function is to lift, lower, and swing 
loads at various radii (see Figs. 5-0.2.1-6 and 5-0.2.1-7). 
Wheel-mounted crane (single control stations): A crane consisting of a rotating 
superstructure, operating machinery, and boom, mounted on a crane carrier equipped with 
axles and rubber-tired wheels for travel, a power source, and having a single control station 
for driving and operating. Its function is to lift, lower, and swing loads at various radii (see 
Figs. 5-0.2.1-8 through 5-0.2.1-10). 
 
MOBILE CRANE GLOSSARY  
Accessory: A secondary part or assembly of parts that contributes to the overall function 
and usefulness of a machine. 
Administrative or Regulatory Authority: A governmental agency or the employer in the 
absence of governmental jurisdiction. 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI): Provides the accrediting methodology 
for development of ASME standards among others. 
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Angle indicator (boom): An accessory that measures the angle of the boom to the 
horizontal. 
Anti-two-block device: A device that, when activated, disengages all crane functions 
whose movement can cause two-blocking. 
Auxiliary hoist: A secondary hoist rope system used either in conjunction with, or 
independently of, the main hoist system. 
Axis of rotation: The vertical axis around which the crane superstructure rotates. 
Axle: The shaft or spindle with which or about which a type of axle assembly including 
housings, gearing, differential, bearings, and mounting appurtenances. 
Axle (bogie): Two or more axles mounted in tandem in a frame so as to divide the load 
between the axles and permit vertical oscillation of the wheels. 
Ballast: Weight used to supplement the weight of the machine in providing stability for 
lifting working loads (the term ballast is normally associated with locomotive cranes). 
Base (mounting): The traveling base on which the rotating superstructure of a locomotive 
or crawler crane is mounted. 
Boom (crane): A member hinged to the rotating superstructure and used for supporting 
the hoisting tackle. 
Boom angle: The angle above or below horizontal of the longitudinal axis of the base 
boom section. 
Boom hoist mechanism: Means for supporting the boom and controlling the boom angle. 
Boom point: The outer extremity of the crane boom, containing the hoist sheave assembly. 
Boom point sheave assembly: An assembly of sheaves and pin built as an integral part of 
the boom point. 
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Boom stop: A device used to limit the angle of the boom at the highest recommended 
position. 
Brake: A device used for retarding or stopping motion. 
Cab: A housing that covers the rotating superstructure machinery or the operator’s or 
driver’s station. 
Clutch: A means for engagement or disengagement of power. 
Commercial truck vehicle: A commercial motor vehicle designed primarily for the 
transportation of property in connection with business and industry.  
Counterweight: Weight used to supplement the weight of the machine in providing 
stability for lifting working loads. 
Crane carrier: The undercarriage of a wheel-mounted crane specifically designed for 
transporting the rotating crane superstructure. It may or may not provide its own travel 
mechanism. It is distinguished from a commercial truck vehicle in that it is not designed to 
transport personnel, materials, or equipment other than the crane rotating superstructure. 
Critical lift: A hoisting or lifting operation that has been determined to present an 
increased level of risk beyond normal lifting activities. For example, increased risk may 
relate to personnel injury, damage to property, interruption of plant production, delays in 
schedule, release of hazards to the environment, or other jobsite factors. 
Cross-over points: In multiple layer spooling of rope on a drum, those points of rope 
contact where the rope crosses the preceding rope layer. 
Drum: The cylindrical member around which a rope is wound for lifting and lowering the 
load or boom. 
Dynamic (loading): Loads introduced into the machine or its components due to 
accelerating or decelerating forces. 
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Ensure: Term used when the meaning “take steps to see that” or “make sure” is intended. 
Flange point: A point of contact between rope and drum flange where the rope changes 
layers. 
Gantry (A-frame): A structural frame, extending above the superstructure, to which the 
boom support ropes are reeved. 
Hoist mechanism: A hoist drum and rope reeving system used for lifting and lowering 
loads. 
Jib: An extension attached to the boom point to provide added boom length for lifting 
specified loads. The jib may be in line with the boom or offset to various angles in the 
vertical plane of the boom. 
Jib backstop: A device that will restrain the jib from turning over backward. 
Jobsite: Work area defined by the construction contract. 
Load (working): The external load in pounds (kilograms) applied to the crane, including 
the weight of load attaching equipment such as lower load block, shackles, and slings. 
Load block, lower: The assembly of hook or shackle, swivel, sheaves, pins, and frame 
suspended by the hoisting ropes. 
Load block, upper: The assembly of shackle, swivel, sheaves, pins, and frame suspended 
from the boom point. 
Load indicator: A device that measures the weight of the load. 
Load ratings: Crane ratings in pounds (kilograms) established by the manufacturer in 
accordance with Section 5-1.1. 
Luffing attachment: A front-end attachment for a mobile crane that uses an upper working 
boom or jib, which is capable of changing angle during operation and is mounted on top of 
a lower main boom. This is distinguished from a fixed jib where the operating angle cannot 
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be changed during operation. Typically, the lower boom operating angle can also be 
changed. 
Mast (boom): A frame hinged at or near the boom hinge for use in connection with 
supporting a boom. The head of the mast is usually supported and raised or lowered by the 
boom hoist ropes. 
Mast (jib): A frame hinged at or near the boom point for use in connection with supporting 
a jib. 
Minimum breaking force: The minimum load at which a new and unused wire rope will 
break when loaded to destruction in direct tension. 
Multiple load line operation: Simultaneous use of two or more lines reeved over sheaves 
on a single shaft or multiple shafts of a crane with multiple load drums to lift, rotate, or 
hold a single load. 
Normal operating conditions: Conditions during which a crane is performing functions 
within the manufacturer’s operating recommendations. Under these conditions, the 
operator is at an operator control station described in the instructions for the crane; no other 
persons, except those designated, are to be on the crane. 
Operational aid: An accessory that provides information to facilitate operation of a crane 
or that takes control of particular functions without action of the operator when a limiting 
condition is sensed. Examples of such devices include, but are not limited to, the following: 
anti-two-block device, rated capacity indicator, rated capacity (load) limiter, boom angle 
or radius indicator, lattice boom hoist disconnect device, boom length indicator, crane level 
indicator, drum rotation indicator, load indicator, and wind speed indicator. 
Outriggers: Extendable or fixed members attached to the mounting base, which rest on 
supports at the outer ends used to support the crane. 
131 
 
Pawl (dog): A device for positively holding a member against motion in one or more 
directions. 
Payload: The load, or loads, being transported by the commercial truck chassis from place 
to place. 
Pendant: A rope or strand of specified length with fixed end connections. 
Power-controlled lowering: A system or device in the power train, other than the load 
hoist brake, that can control the lowering rate of speed of the load hoist mechanism. 
Qualified operator: An operator who has met the requirements of paras. 5-3.1.2(a) 
through (c). 
Qualified person: A person who, by possession of a recognized degree in an applicable 
field or certificate of professional standing, or who, by extensive knowledge, training, and 
experience, has successfully demonstrated the ability to solve or resolve problems relating 
to the subject matter and work. 
Rail clamp: A tong-like metal device mounted on a locomotive crane car, which can be 
connected to the track. 
Rated capacity indicator: A device that automatically monitors radius, load weight, and 
load rating, and warns the crane operator of an overload condition. 
Rated capacity (load) limiter: A device that automatically monitors radius, load weight, 
and load rating and prevents movements of the crane, which would result in an overload 
condition. 
Reeving: A rope system in which the rope travels around drums and sheaves. 
Repetitive pickup point: When operating on a short cycle operation, the rope being used 
on a single layer and being spooled repetitively over a short portion of the drum. 
Rope: Refers to wire rope unless otherwise specified.  
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Rotation-resistant rope: A wire rope consisting of an inner layer of strand laid in one 
direction covered by a layer of strand laid in the opposite direction. This has the effect of 
counteracting torque by reducing the tendency of the finished rope to rotate. 
Running rope: A rope that travels around sheaves or drums.  
Shall: Term used to indicate that a rule is mandatory and must be followed. 
Should: Term used to indicate that a rule is a recommendation, the advisability of which 
depends on the facts in each situation. 
Side loading: A load applied to an angle to the vertical plane of the boom. 
Standby crane: A crane that is not in regular service but that is used occasionally or 
intermittently as required.  
Standing (guy) rope: A supporting rope that maintains a constant distance between the 
points of attachment to the two components connected by the rope. 
Structural competence: The ability of the machine and its components to withstand the 
stresses imposed by applied loads. 
Superstructure: The rotating upper frame structure of the machine and the operating 
machinery mounted thereon. 
Swing: Rotation of the superstructure for movement of loads in a horizontal direction about 
the axis of rotation. 
Swing mechanism: The machinery involved in providing rotation of the superstructure. 
Swivel: A load-carrying member with thrust bearings to permit rotation under load in a 
plane perpendicular to the direction of the load. 
Swiveling: The rotation of the load attachment portion (hook or shackle) of a load block 
(lower) or hook assembly about its axis of suspension in relation to the load line(s). 
Tackle: An assembly of ropes and sheaves arranged for lifting, lowering, or pulling. 
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Telescoping boom: Consists of a base boom from which one or more boom sections are 
telescoped for additional length. 
Transit: The moving or transporting of a crane from one jobsite to another. 
Travel: The function of the machine moving under its own power from one location to 
another on a jobsite. 
Two-block damage prevention feature: A system that will stall when two-blocking 
occurs without causing damage to the hoist rope or crane machinery components. 
Two-block warning feature: A warning device to alert the operator of an impending two-
blocking condition. 
Two-blocking: The condition in which the lower load block or hook assembly comes in 
contact with the upper load block or boom point sheave assembly. 
Wheel base: The distance between centers of front and rear axles. For a multiple axle 
assembly, the axle center for wheel base measurement is taken as the midpoint of the 
assembly. 
Whipline (runner or auxiliary): A secondary rope system usually of lighter load capacity 
than that provided by the main rope system. 
Winch head: A power-driven spool for handling loads by means of friction between fiber 
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